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RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate: An Unconstitutional
Accommodation of Religion
Frederick Mark Gedicks* and Rebecca G. Van Tassell**
Litigation surrounding use of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA") to exempt employers from the "contraception mandate" of the Afford-
able Care Act ("ACA") is moving steadily towards resolution in the U.S. Su-
preme Court. Both opponents and supporters of the mandate, however, have
overlooked the Establishment Clause limits on such exemptions.
The heated religious liberty rhetoric aimed at the mandate has obscured
that RFRA is a "permissive" rather than "mandatory" accommodation of relig-
ion - a government concession to religious belief and practice that is not re-
quired by the Free Exercise Clause. Permissive accommodations must satisfy
Establishment Clause constraints, notably the requirement that the accommoda-
tion not impose material burdens on third parties who do not believe or partici-
pate in the accommodated practice. Many of the Court's decisions under the
Free Exercise Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exhibit a
similar aversion to cost-shifting religious accommodations.
While it is likely that RFRA facially complies with the Establishment
Clause, it violates the clause's limits on permissive accommodation as applied to
the mandate. RFRA exemptions from the mandate would deny the employees of
an exempted employer their ACA entitlement to contraceptives without cost shar-
ing, forcing employees to purchase with their own money contraceptives and
related services that would otherwise be available to them at no cost beyond
their healthcare insurance premiums.
Neither courts nor commentators seem aware that a line of permissive ac-
commodation cases prohibits shifting the material costs of accommodating an-
ticontraception beliefs from the employers who hold them to employees who do
not. One federal appellate court has already mistakenly dismissed this cost
shifting as irrelevant to the permissibility of RFRA exemptions from the
mandate.
The impermissibility of material cost shifting under the Establishment
Clause is a threshold doctrine whose application is logically prior to all of the
RFRA issues on which the courts are now focused: if RFRA exemptions from the
mandate violate the Establishment Clause, then that is the end of RFRA exemp-
tions, regardless of whether for-profit corporations are "persons" exercising re-
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ligion, the mandate is a substantial burden on employers' anticontraception
beliefs, or the mandate is not the least restrictive means of protecting a compel-
ling government interest.
Part I summarizes the legal mechanics of the mandate and briefly describes
the three classes of antimandate plaintiffs - churches, religious nonprofit orga-
nizations, and for-profit businesses owned by anticontraception believers. Part
II details Establishment Clause decisions that prohibit permissive accommoda-
tions imposing material burdens on third parties, as well as Free Exercise
Clause and Title VII decisions that exhibit a similar concern with such burdens.
Part III applies this rule to RFRA exemptions from the mandate, showing that
the cost shifting entailed by such exemptions violates the Establishment Clause.
We conclude that the existing regulatory regime that exempts churches, accom-
modates religious nonprofits, and leaves for-profit businesses subject to the
mandate is the proper balance of private and government interests in the radi-
cally plural society that the United States has become.
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INTRODUCTION: RFRA AS PERMISSIVE ACCOMMODATION
The "contraception mandate" of the Affordable Care Act' ("ACA")
requires employer healthcare plans to cover all FDA-approved contracep-
tives. 2 Some Roman Catholic and conservative Protestant employers have
I Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 26, 29, 30, and 42 U.S.C.).
242 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2011). The "contraception mandate" is distinct from the
ACA's "individual mandate" (which taxes most persons who do not purchase health insur-
ance) and "employer mandate" (which taxes employers with more than fifty employees who
do not provide group health insurance to their employees). Professor Lederman has argued
344
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challenged the "Mandate" (as we will refer to it) in federal court, arguing
that it forces them to violate religious teachings that condemn some or all of
the mandated contraceptives.' Although these plaintiffs make constitutional
arguments,4 their strongest claims arise under the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act5 ("RFRA"), which prohibits the federal government from sub-
stantially burdening religious exercise unless it proves that the burden is the
least restrictive means of protecting a compelling interest.6
that the "employer mandate" is misnamed since the ACA affords employers an economically
viable choice not to supply group health insurance. Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III -
There Is No "Employer Mandate," BALKINIZATION (Dec. 16, 2013), http://balkn.blogspot.
com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-iiitheres-no-employer.html, archived at http://perma.cc/KNX
2-E6BJ.
3 See HHS Info Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUs LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.
org/hhsinformationcentrall (last visited Mar. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5378-4XD4.
The Becket Fund maintains a website that tracks these actions. As of January 2014, ninety-
three lawsuits had been filed challenging the Mandate as a violation of religious liberty. Id.
' The most common constitutional argument is that the Mandate is not a "generally appli-
cable" law under current free exercise doctrine because of its many secular exemptions, and
cannot satisfy strict scrutiny for the same reason. See, e.g., Terri Day & Leticia Diaz, The
Affordable Care Act and Religious Freedom: The Next Battleground, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
Pot'Y 63, 68, 94, 97 (2013); Steven D. Smith & Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception
Mandate and Religious Freedom, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 261, 261-62 (2013); Douglas
Laycock, Free Exercise of Religion and Insuring Contraception, EERDWORD (Mar. 19, 2012),
http://eerdword.wordpress.com/2012/03/19/free-exercise-of-religion-and-insuring-contracep
tion-by-douglas-laycock/, archived at http://perma.cc/JLS3-VDTZ. This argument, however,
depends on an implausibly expansive definition of "generally applicable." Compare Douglas
Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id.2304427, archived at http://perma.al
M2N8-UCME [hereinafter Laycock, Religious Liberty] (arguing that to satisfy general appli-
cability, a "law that burdens the exercise of religion cannot have any exceptions, or any gaps
in coverage, that allow secular conduct to cause the same alleged harm as the regulated relig-
ious conduct" (emphasis added)), with Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 99 (4th Cir.
2013) (finding ACA employer and individual mandates are generally applicable laws despite
multiple secular exemptions because they "do not set apart any particular religious group" for
special burdens (emphasis in original)). For succinct arguments that the Mandate is not suffi-
ciently underinclusive to violate the Free Exercise Clause, see Andrew Koppelman, "Freedom
of the Church" and the Authority of the State, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 145, 156-164
(2013); and Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part IV: The Myth of Underinclusiveness, BAL-
KANIZATION (Jan. 21, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/01/hobby-lobby-part-iv-myth-of.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/Z3ZD-8S4N.
Some anti-Mandate actions have also alleged that the regulatory process by which the Man-
date was adopted violated the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., Priests for Life v. U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services, AM. FREEDOM LAW CENTER (Feb. 12, 2012), http://
www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-054.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/B5H4-TNYM (discussing
and linking to complaint). A complete analysis of these and other arguments about the legality
of the Mandate is beyond the scope of this Article.
542 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2011).
6 Id. §§ 2000bb(b)(2), 2000bb-l(a)-2000bb-l(b). "Government shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applica-
bility . . . [unless] it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest." Id. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (em-dash & paragraph numbers
omitted). RFRA is a general exemption statute that purports to grant relief from any statute or
other government action that substantially burdens religious exercise, whether enacted before
or after RFRA. The Supreme Court invalidated its application to the states in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), but it continues to apply to all federal government action.
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Opponents contend that the Mandate substantially burdens their an-
ticontraception beliefs and practices without satisfying RFRA's compelling-
interest test.7 Mandate supporters, meanwhile, have struggled to articulate
the precise constitutional liberty that RFRA exemptions from the Mandate
would burden: there is no constitutional right to have one's employer pay for
contraceptives, and RFRA exemptions would not interfere with the repro-
ductive privacy right of employees and their family members to purchase
contraceptives with their own money.' When supporters complain that ex-
emptions would license employers to impose their anticontraceptive beliefs
on employees, opponents respond that employers just want the government
to leave them alone.9
In all of this, no attention has been paid to the Establishment Clause
implications of RFRA exemptions from the Mandate. Little in the fast-
growing literature on the Mandate discusses whether RFRA exemptions
might violate the clause's limitations on accommodation of religion, 0 and
the question has been overlooked by every appellate opinion holding or ar-
guing against the Mandate's legality under RFRA."
'See, e.g., Helen Alvard, No Compelling Interest: The "Birth Control" Mandate and Re-
ligious Freedom, 58 VILL. L. REv. 379, 379-82 (2013); Michael Sean Winters, Contra
Kaveny, NAT'L CATH. REP. (Jan. 14, 2013), http://ncronline.org/blogs/distinctly-catholic/con
tra-kaveny, archived at http://perma.ccKrE7E-TGYP.
See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1146 (10th Cir. 2013)
(en banc) (5-3 decision), No. 13-354 (U.S. argued Mar. 25, 2014). See generally, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9 Compare Frederick Mark Gedicks, With Religious Liberty for All: A Defense of the Af-
fordable Care Act's Contraception Coverage Mandate, 6 ADVANCE: J. ACS IssuE GROUPS
135, 135 (2012) ("One's religious liberty does not include the right to interfere with the liberty
of others."), with Smith & Corbin, supra note 4, at 265 (anticontraception employers "are
merely arguing that, under RFRA, and given their religious objections, they themselves should
not be required to pay for the coverage").
10 See, e.g., Alvard, supra note 7; Thomas C. Berg, Progressive Arguments for Religious
Organizational Freedom: Reflections on the HHS Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 279
(2013); Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
151 (2012); Day & Diaz, supra note 4; Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of
Conscience, 28 J.L. & POL. 91 (2013); Koppelman, supra note 4; Laycock, Religious Liberty,
supra note 4; Holly Fernandez Lynch, Religious Liberty, Conscience, and the Affordable Care
Act, 20 ETHicAL PERSP. 118 (2013); Smith & Corbin, supra note 4, at 268; Jonathan T. Tan,
Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corporations, and the HHS Mandate: Why the Mandate
Does Not Satisfy RFRA 's Requirements, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1301 (2013); Edward Whelan,
The HHS Contraception Mandate vs. the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2179 (2012); Symposium, The Bishops & Religious Liberty, COMMONWEAL (May 30,
2012, 3:50 PM), http://commonwealmagazine.org/bishops-religious-liberty, archived at http://
perma.cc/GK6X-JURC. But cf Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is a Burden: Protect-
ing "Third Parties" in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 DRAKE L. REv. 433 (2014) (arguing
that burdens on third parties from RFRA exemptions from the Mandate is a factor to be
weighed in the compelling-interest balance); Gregory P. Magarian, The New Religious Institu-
tionalism Meets the Old Establishment Clause 28-29, 36-37 (Nov. 7. 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2353186, archived at http://perma.cc/8PKJ-
3WT5 (concluding that Mandate's religious nonprofit accommodation "protects employees
who want contraceptive coverage from the power of accommodated religious employers").
" See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (2-1 decision) (holding sub-
stantial likelihood that Mandate violates RFRA, without analyzing Establishment Clause im-
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This is a critical gap in Mandate case law and literature. The Establish-
ment Clause protects religious liberty, but in a different manner than does
the Free Exercise Clause: the Establishment Clause is a structural bar on
government action rather than a guarantee of personal rights.12 Violations of
the Establishment Clause cannot be waived by the parties or balanced away
by weightier private or government interests, as can violations of the Free
Exercise Clause." RFRA's compliance with the Establishment Clause is
thus a threshold requirement not unlike subject matter jurisdiction. 14 If
RFRA exemptions from the Mandate violate the Establishment Clause, then
that would be the end of the matter, even if for-profit corporations were
found to be "persons" entitled to RFRA protection and the Mandate were
further found to substantially burden the religious exercise of such "per-
plications of RFRA exemption); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d
1208, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (2-1 decision); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 407-15 (3d Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J., dis-
senting), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1136-44 (finding
substantial likelihood that Mandate violates RFRA and declaring third-party burdens constitu-
tionally irrelevant); see also Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1118, 2013 WL
1276025, at *3 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (granting preliminary injunction pending appeal because
plaintiff showed reasonable likelihood of success on RFRA exemption claim, without mention
of Establishment Clause).
The government raised the Establishment Clause issue at oral argument in Korte, but the
court refused to consider it, finding that the issue was raised too late and noting that the
Supreme Court had rejected a facial Establishment Clause challenge to RFRA's nearly identi-
cal twin, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). See 735 F.3d
at 684 n.19.
12 E.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243, 244 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589-90 (1992); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 1991);
REx E. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 129 (1981); Carl H. Esbeck, The Estab-
lishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6, 21
(1998); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Be-
tween Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 119, 122-23 (2009);
Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, The Ties That Bind: The Constitution, Structural Restraints, and
Government Action Overseas, 96 GEO. L.J. 237, 243 (2007); see Frederick Mark Gedicks,
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Histori-
cal Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669, 698 (2013) (arguing that although the other provisions of the
First Amendment are conceptualized as personal rights, the Establishment Clause is under-
stood to be "a structural limitation that wholly disables government from establishing
religion").
13 E.g., Weisman, 505 U.S. at 596; Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1266
(10th Cir. 2008) (opinion by McConnell, J.); Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421, 432 n.32
(D. Conn. 1970), affd mem., 403 U.S. 955 (1971); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 12, at 129,
135-36, 146; Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Af-
firmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330, 333 n.14 (1985);
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling,
96 CALIF. L. REv. 123, 153-54 (2008); see Gedicks, supra note 12, at 698 ("Unlike violations
of personal rights .. . Establishment Clause violations may not be counterbalanced by weighty
government interests or subjected to equitable defenses like waiver.").
14 See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 856 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding sua
sponte that court lacked jurisdiction over case under Establishment Clause), af'd, 83 F.3d 455
(D.C. Cir. 1996); cf Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14
(1976) (holding courts may "exercise no jurisdiction" over a "subject matter" involving "the-
ological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the
members of the church to [its] standard of morals ").
2014] 347
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sons" or their owners without satisfying the compelling-interest test under
RFRA.
While RFRA seems facially to comply with the Establishment Clause,"
it nevertheless violates the clause as applied to the Mandate.'6 Amidst the
heated religious liberty rhetoric surrounding the Mandate," it is easy to miss
that RFRA is a "permissive" accommodation - that is, a voluntary govern-
ment accommodation of religion that is not constitutionally required by the
Free Exercise Clause. RFRA's stated purpose, after all, is to provide more
protection for religious exercise'" than is provided by the Free Exercise
Clause after Employment Division v. Smith.'9 RFRA, therefore, must satisfy
the various Establishment Clause limitations on permissive government ac-
commodation of religion.
Establishment Clause doctrine is famously chaotic. It encompasses
multiple "tests" that purport to control the outcome of cases even though the
"1 See Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423
(2006) (upholding RFRA as applied to 130-member sect seeking exemption for sacramental
use of hallucinogen prohibited by comprehensive federal drug-control statute, without address-
ing its facial constitutionality); cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713-14 (2005) (rejecting
facial Establishment Clause challenge to RLUIPA). The Court has never directly addressed
this issue, and some commentators continue to argue that RFRA facially violates the Establish-
ment Clause. See, e.g., Lawrence Sager, Remarks at Brooklyn Law School Symposium, Re-
ligious Freedom and Equal Treatment: An International Look (Oct. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tgIrZq6J5Y, archived at http://perma.cc/C6NP-YHT5.
16 See infra Part III.
" The Mandate ignited a firestorm of rhetorical excess that shows no sign of abating.
E.g., Steve Chapman, Inoculating Against Religious Freedom, REALCLEARPOLMCS (Feb. 2,
2012), http://www.realclearpolitics/articles/2012/02/02/innoculating-against-religiousfree
doml 12995.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4S2T-KNJ3 ("[M]any of those who think it's
wrong to forbid Americans to buy contraceptives think it's just fine to require them to buy
contraceptives. In this group, unfortunately, are President Barack Obama and [Health and
Human Services] Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, who are hell-bent on enforcing that mandate on
nearly everyone."); Michael Foust, New HHS Rule on Abortion Mandate 'Inadequate,' BAP-
TIsr PRESs (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.bpnews.net/printerfriendly.asp?ID=39628, archived at
http://perma.cc/3H8R-4AMY (quoting an outside source as characterizing Mandate's religious
exemption and accommodation as "radically inadequate"); Shane Goldmacher, Gingrich Says
Obama 'Declared War on the Catholic Church,'NATL J. (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.national
joumal.com/2012-presidential-campaign/gingrich-says-obama-declared-war-on-the-catholic-
church-20120205, archived at http://perma.cc/AW3A-EE6H; John S. Hoff & Grace-Marie Tur-
ner, The Tortured Path of Evading the Constitution, REALCLEARPOLICY (Apr. 8, 2013), http://
www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/08/thetorturedpath_of_evadingthe_constitution
.479.htnd, archived at http://perma.cc/6KTV-FTKZ ("Many employers . . . argue that the
Mandate is a violation of their First Amendment right to freely exercise their religion. . . . The
administration's most recent attempt at an accommodation is begrudgingly narrow in scope,
inadequate, and unworkable.").
The rhetoric of Mandate supporters is hardly more restrained. See, e.g., Joan Vennochi,
Opinion, Catholic Church's Unfair Attack Against Obama, Bos. GLOBE (Feb. 2, 2012), http://
www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/02/02/catholic-church-unfair-attack-against-obama/Qn99
IhKZGNBGMA7ZPCxziO/story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZTP8-TGRX ("[Catholic]
bishops are basically saying to hell with Obama.").
I" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006).
19 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct.
1651 (2011).
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Court frequently ignores the tests.2 0 One consistent theme in permissive ac-
commodation decisions, however, is the impermissibility of cost shifting.
Irrespective of the doctrinal test it applies (or ignores), the Court condemns
permissive accommodations on Establishment Clause grounds when the ac-
commodations impose significant burdens on third parties who do not be-
lieve or participate in the accommodated practice. Broad swaths of the
Court's jurisprudence under the Free Exercise Clause and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196421 exhibit a similar aversion to such cost-shifting
religious accommodations. Indeed, the Court has permitted a cost-shifting
permissive accommodation in only one case, which involved the nonprofit
activities of a church. 22
Courts and commentators seem unaware that by shifting the material
costs of accommodating anticontraception beliefs from the employers who
hold them to their employees who do not, RFRA exemptions from the Man-
date violate an Establishment Clause constraint on permissive accommoda-
tion. One federal appellate court has already mistakenly dismissed this cost
shifting as constitutionally insignificant.23
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I summarizes the legal
mechanics of the Mandate and the three classes of entities and persons that
have objected to it - churches, synagogues, and other religious congrega-
tions; religious nonprofit businesses; and for-profit business entities and
their individual religious owners. Part II discusses relevant aspects of Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine governing permissive accommodation, notably its
prohibition on government action that shifts the material costs of an accom-
modated religious practice from adherents to nonadherents. Part II also dis-
cusses free exercise and Title VII decisions that demonstrate a similar
20 The Court generally relies on two doctrinal tests to decide Establishment Clause cases:
the "endorsement test," see, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 797 (1989)
(holding government action that an informed and reasonable observer would understand to
have the purpose or effect of endorsing religion violates Establishment Clause), and the much-
maligned "Lemon test," see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding that
government action that aids religion violates Establishment Clause if it lacks a secular purpose
or a primarily secular effect, or entangles government with religion). It has never explained
why it uses one test rather than the other, and not infrequently decides cases without invoking
either one. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 721 (2010) (plurality opinion) (finding
Latin cross at veterans memorial could have secular meaning, without applying either test);
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (up-
holding Ten Commandments monument displayed on state capitol grounds on basis of "legal
judgment," without invoking either test); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1982) (up-
holding practice of nondenominational state legislative prayer on basis of historical analysis
without invoking Lemon).
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
22 See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 116-29.
23 See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1144-45 (10th Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (summarily dismissing government's argument that RFRA exemption would impose em-
ployer's anticontraception beliefs on employees who do not share them because, inter alia,
"[a]ccommodations for religion frequently operate by lifting a burden from the accommo-
dated party and placing it elsewhere") No. 13-354 (U.S. argued Mar. 25, 2014).
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concern. Part III shows how exemptions from the Mandate for the benefit of
for-profit and many nonprofit businesses would violate this Establishment
Clause prohibition. We conclude with some observations about the limits of
permissive accommodation in a radically plural society like the United
States.
I. THE MANDATE AND ITS LITIGATION OPPONENTS
A. Statutory and Regulatory Structure
The ACA requires that group health plans and individual insurance pol-
icies cover a range of "preventive healthcare services" without cost to the
patient beyond the basic health insurance premium.24 Final administrative
rules adopted by the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and
the Treasury (the "Departments") under the ACA defined "preventive
healthcare services" for women to include medically prescribed FDA-ap-
proved contraceptive methods, including emergency contraception, together
with related services and counseling. 25 Employers and insurers are thus le-
gally "mandated" by the ACA and associated regulations to cover these con-
traceptives and services in their healthcare plans as preventive services not
subject to cost sharing.26
The final rules implementing the Mandate exempted some religious or-
ganizations and accommodated others. The Mandate exempts the health in-
surance plans of churches, their "integrated auxiliaries," conventions and
associations of churches, and religious orders falling within Internal Reve-
nue Code provisions defining religious nonprofit organizations.27 Exempt
religious employers are wholly relieved from complying with the Mandate
without any action on their part beyond what might already be required by
2442 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2006).
2 Section 2713 included within the definition of preventive healthcare services "such
additional preventive care and screenings" not otherwise covered, "as provided for in compre-
hensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration" (the
"HRSA"). 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). The HRSA subsequently adopted women's coverage
guidelines that included "contraceptive methods and counseling," defined as "[a]ll Food and
Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient ed-
ucation and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity." Women's Preventive Ser-
vices: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, HRSA, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguide
lines/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YW4-Y57E. These Guidelines
were adopted by the Departments on July 2, 2013. 45 CFR § 147.130(a)(i)(iv)(A) (2013).
This Article cites throughout to the final Mandate rules as codified at 45 C.F.R.§§ 147.130-131 (2013).
26 "Cost sharing" is defined by the Department of Health and Human Services as "[a]ny
contribution consumers make towards the cost of their healthcare." The two most common
types are fees to be paid by the consumer "up-front," such as premiums and enrollment fees,
and "at-time-of-service" fees, such as copayments and deductibles. Cost-Sharing Definition,
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE REs. & QuALrry, http://archive.ahrq.gov/chip/text/content/
cost sharing/cost sharing.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/CJ2V-
NW2T.
2745 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2013).
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the Internal Revenue Code. 28 "Exempt" employers, in other words, may
operate as if the Mandate does not exist and refuse to cover mandated con-
traceptives in their health plans without action, application, or notice to the
government on their part.
Religious employers that fall outside the foregoing exemption are sub-
ject to the Mandate, but may be eligible for an "accommodation" that re-
lieves them of the obligation to cover mandated contraceptives in their
health plans while still ensuring that such contraceptives are made available
to employees without cost sharing. Nonexempt religious employers are eli-
gible for this accommodation if they meet four criteria:
(1) They have religious objections to providing some or all of the
mandated contraceptives;
(2) They are organized and operate as nonprofit entities;
(3) They hold themselves out as religious organizations; and
(4) They "self-certify" that they satisfy criteria (1) through (3).29
"Self-certification" involves completion and execution of a form pro-
vided by the Department of Health and Human Services representing the
religious nonprofit's satisfaction of the accommodation criteria listed above.
The religious nonprofit need not file the form with any government agency,
but must retain it and make it available upon proper government request.30
This accommodation is premised on numerous studies that conclude
adding complete contraceptive coverage to a health insurance plan is, at
worst, cost neutral - the expense incurred by insurers to provide contracep-
tives is equal to or less than the expenses of pregnancy, childbirth, and other
health events that are prevented by the use of contraceptives.3 1 In other
words, health insurers who provide full contraceptive coverage at no addi-
tional cost to their plan participants will find that the cost of doing so is
offset by the plan expenses that such coverage avoids.
Nonexempt religious employers eligible for an accommodation must
notify their third-party health plan insurer (or, if self-insured, their plan ad-
ministrator) that they object to some or all of the mandated contraceptives.32
The insurer or administrator is then required to pay the cost of mandated
contraceptives itself,33 without cost sharing on the part of either plan partici-
28 See I.R.C. §§ 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), 6033(a)(3)(A)(iii) (2012) (defining religious nonprofit
entities for purposes of federal income tax code).
29 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b) (2013).
30 Id. § 147.131(b)(4).
31 See Gedicks, supra note 9, at 145 n.47 (summarizing the argument and data on cost
neutrality).
32 Id. § 147.13 1(c)(1). The plan issuer or administrator is not permitted to ask for evi-
dence supporting the self-certification or otherwise to question the employer's eligibility for
the accommodation. See id.
3 Id. § 147.131(c)(2)(i).
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pants or the accommodated religious employer.3 4 The final rules expressly
prohibit the insurer or administrator from shifting to the accommodated re-
ligious employer any of the costs of covering mandated contraceptives di-
rectly,35 and even require insurers and administrators to segregate funds used
to pay mandated contraceptive expenses from funds used to pay covered
expenses under the accommodated employer's healthcare plan.36
Because studies show that provision and payment for contraception
within a healthcare plan is at least cost neutral, the Departments concluded
that third-party insurers would incur no net additional costs in providing
contraception without cost sharing to employees of accommodated religious
employers.37
The situation of administrators for self-insured plans is more compli-
cated, because their costs incurred in covering employee expenses for man-
dated contraceptives are not offset by savings in plan reimbursements for
covered expenses like childbirth. If third-party plan administrators cannot
recoup such costs in connection with self-insured plans, they are entitled to
an offsetting credit against the federal tax they pay on premiums they collect
from the healthcare plans that they sell through the ACA's insurance
exchanges."
The structure of the Mandate, its church exemption, and its regulatory
accommodation of religious nonprofits have meant that various kinds of
plaintiffs have brought anti-Mandate litigation. As the Mandate treats each
34 Id. § 147.131(c)(2)(ii). The insurer or administrator is also required to supply notice of
the availability of this direct coverage when employees and covered dependents enroll in the
plan. Id. § 147.131(d).
We have assumed that insurers or administrators will directly reimburse the providers of
mandated contraceptives, rather than requiring plan participants to pay for them out-of-pocket
and then seek reimbursement themselves from the insurer or administrator. Although the final
rules are ambiguous, out-of-pocket payment by participants with later reimbursement would
appear to violate the ACA's statutory requirement that preventive services be provided without
cost sharing. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2011).
3-s45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(2)(ii).
36 Id. The Departments conceded that this accommodation does not work for self-insured
plans without a third-party administrator, but determined that there is no current evidence that
any such plans exist. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
78 Fed. Reg. 39,869, 39,880 (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter Preventive Services] (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590, 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156). The final rules neverthe-
less provide a safe-harbor exemption from the Mandate for any self-insured plan that lacks a
third-party administrator upon certification that it lacks such an administrator and has provided
notification to plan beneficiaries that its plan does not cover some or all of the mandated
contraceptives. Id.
1 Preventive Services, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,872-73, 39,877. The final rules also provide
that, to the extent insurers in fact incur net costs from providing mandated contraceptives
without cost sharing, the insurers may allocate these costs as an administrative expense to all
healthcare plans that they insure (other than those entitled to the religious accommodation).
Preventive Services, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,878.
" See Preventive Services, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,882-86. Third-party administrators who do
not pay the federally funded exchange tax are authorized to arrange for an insurer that does
pay the tax to cover the cost of mandated contraceptives that the accommodated employer
declines to cover. Id.
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type of plaintiff differently, they allege different harms, and their employees
are burdened to different degrees.
B. Varieties of Litigation Opponents
The Roman Catholic Church condemns the use of artificial contracep-
tion to prevent pregnancy as a violation of the natural procreative order.39
Protestant denominations and Jewish groups, by contrast, do not generally
oppose contraception on religious grounds. However, the Mandate covers
so-called "emergency" contraceptives such as "morning-after" and "week-
after" pills and intrauterine devices ("IUDs"), which some believe avoid
pregnancy by preventing a fertilized ovum from implanting in the womb. 40
Many evangelical and conservative Protestant denominations and orthodox
Jewish groups denounce emergency contraception as tantamount to abortion,
as does the Catholic Church.4 1
Anti-Mandate plaintiffs include actual churches and synagogues, relig-
ious nonprofit businesses and entities, and for-profit businesses owned by
persons holding religious anticontraception beliefs.
3 Pope Paul VI, Humane Vitae: Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Paul VI on Regulation
of Birth, VATICAN (July 25, 1968), http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/paul-vi/encyclicals/docu
ments/hLp-vienc_25071968_humanae-vitae-en.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C7SZ-
XWP9. Catholic teaching does permit the use of contraceptives for medical reasons other than
prevention of pregnancy. Pope Francis has recently moderated the Church's tone on this teach-
ing. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Pope Says Church Is "Obsessed" with Gays, Abortion and
Birth Control, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/20/worldleu
rope/pope-bluntly-faults-churchs-focus-on-gays-and-abortion.html?_r=0, archived at http://
perma.cclCG4X-Z4ZC.
40 Although FDA-mandated labels indicate that some emergency contraceptives may oper-
ate by preventing implantation, see Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 4, at 14, the great
weight of scientific evidence shows that they prevent pregnancy only by inhibiting ovulation
or otherwise preventing fertilization in the first place, see, e.g., JAMES TkUSSELL ET A.., EMER-
GENCY CONTRACEFTION: A LAST CHANCE TO PREVENT UNINTENDED PREGNANCY 5-7 (2014),
available at http://ec.princeton.edulquestions/ec-review.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JE26-
5UR3; see also Greenawalt, supra note 10, at 120. While religious believers are constitution-
ally entitled to believe as a matter of faith that emergency contraception works by preventing
implantation and thus is tantamount to abortion, scientific invalidation of that belief might
preclude a finding that mandated coverage of emergency contraception constitutes a substan-
tial burden on religious exercise under RFRA. See Smith & Corbin, supra note 4, at 279-80;
cf Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 766 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (holding
policy requiring teaching creationism as part of high school biology curriculum violated Estab-
lishment Clause). A complete analysis of whether religious beliefs about emergency contra-
ception are scientifically unfounded and how this might affect their protection by RFRA is
beyond the scope of this Article.
41 See Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 4, at 14; Ira. C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The
Contraception Mandate and Religious Liberty, PEw RES. (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.
pewforum.org/2013/02/01/the-contraception-mandate-and-religious-liberty/, archived at http:/
perma.cc/LK9F-DEBX.
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1. Churches, Integrated Auxiliaries, and Associations.
Churches objected that the initial exemption proposed by the Depart-
ments was too narrow and created unacceptable risks of intrusive govern-
ment regulation and litigation. 42 The Departments responded by eliminating
the burdensome conditions for obtaining an exemption in the final rules. 43
As a consequence, anti-Mandate actions brought by churches have been dis-
missed or have gone inactive.
2. Nonprofit Religious Organizations.
The Mandate did not initially provide for any accommodation of relig-
iously sponsored hospitals, social service organizations, colleges and univer-
sities, or other nonprofit entities not exempt as churches.44 Many religious
nonprofits have since announced their satisfaction with the accommodation
provided in the final rules; 45 however, many continue to maintain that even
the accommodation substantially burdens religious exercise by requiring
them to be involved in the use of contraception, albeit in a more limited way.
Such entities have successfully pressed forward with anti-Mandate litigation,
though no final resolution of the issue has been reached by any court.46
42 The exemption originally was confined to religious employers whose purpose was the
"inculcation of religious values," who primarily employed and served persons of their own
faith, and who were nonprofit organizations within the meaning of sections 6033(a)(1),
6033(a)(3)(A)(i), and 6033(a)(3)(A)(iii) of the Internal Revenue Code. See Preventive Ser-
vices, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,871 (2013). This initial formulation of the exemption was taken from
an earlier California statute upheld by the California Supreme Court against religion clause
challenges in a decision on which the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. See
Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 76 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 816 (2004).
43 The final rules exempt all churches that satisfy the definitions in sections
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) and 6033(a)(3)(A)(iii) of the Internal Revenue Code, with which churches
already must comply for federal tax-exempt status. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2013); see Pre-
ventive Services, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,873-74; Berg, supra note 10, at 326 (noting that the final
rules "eliminated the element that had caused the greatest offense: denying an organization
protection simply because it served others outside its faith").
" See Preventive Services, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,871.
45 See, e.g., Joan Frawley Desmond, Catholic Health Association 'Pleased' with HHS
Mandate Rule, NATL CATH. REG. (July 11, 2013), http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/cath
olic-health-association-pleased-with-hhs-mandate-rule/, archived at http://perma.cc/CJQ4-WL
8P.
4 The argument is that even though a religious nonprofit's self-certification relieves it of
the obligation to pay or arrange for contraception coverage in its health plan, it nevertheless
initiates a chain of events that ends in the supply of religiously objectionable contraceptives to
at least some employees. See, e.g., Zubik v. Sebelius, Nos. 13cvl459, 13cv0303 Erie, 2013
WL 6118696, at *32 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2013) (granting preliminary injunction on ground that
Mandate violates RFRA as applied to nonexempt religious nonprofit employer); Stanley Carl-
son-Thies, Colorado Christian University Rejects the HHS Contraceptives Accommodation,
INsT. RELIGIOus FREEDOM ALLIANCE (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.irfalliance.org/colorado-
christian-university-rejects-the-hhs-contraceptives-accommodation/, archived at http://perma.
cc/BD6A-9LXH; see also U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS ET AL., STANDING TO-
GETHER FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: AN OPEN LET-ER TO ALL AMEiUcANs (2013), available at
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/standing-together-for-religi
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3. For-Profit Businesses Owned by Religious Individuals.
The Mandate provides neither exemption nor accommodation to for-
profit employers, who are thus also moving forward with anti-Mandate ac-
tions seeking full exemption from the Mandate under RFRA. Most of these
actions have been brought by corporations, which have a separate legal exis-
tence from their religious owners. Although a few for-profit corporate plain-
tiffs can make colorable claims to being religious institutions,47 the vast
majority are carrying on indisputably secular activities.48 Most appellate de-
cisions on the Mandate have focused on whether such entities are "persons"
that are "exercising religion" within the meaning of RFRA when they en-
gage in unambiguously secular activities, and whether the anti-Mandate be-
liefs of the religious individuals who own them can be attributed to such
entities notwithstanding a separate legal existence independent of their own-
ers. 49 These issues would be mooted if RFRA exemptions were found to
ous-freedom.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/59GX-UG4B (issuing anti-Mandate statement af-
ter the final rules, signed by conservative Christian churches and orthodox Jewish groups);
HHS Final Rule Still Requires Action in Congress, Says Cardinal Dolan, USSCB.ORG (July 3,
2013), http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-137.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/D55J-VG5Y.
Most religious nonprofits that find the regulatory accommodation insufficient have been
granted preliminary relief. See, e.g., Grace Sch. v. Sebelius, No. 3:12-CV-459 JD, 2013 WL
6842772, at *19 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2013); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius, No.
4:12-cv-3009, 2013 WL 6838893, at *25 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2013); S. Nazarene Univ. v.
Sebelius, No. CIV-13-1015-F, 2013 WL 6804265, at *11 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2013); Geneva
Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207, 2013 WL 3071481, at *12 (W.D. Pa. June 18, 2013).
But see Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:12CV253RLM, 2012 WL 6756332, at *4
(N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) (denying preliminary injunctive relief), af'd, No. 13-3853, 2014 WL
687134 (7th Cir. Feb. 21, 2013).
4See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013)
(en banc) (describing one corporate plaintiff as a for-profit bookstore that sells only "Christian
books and materials") No. 13-354 (U.S. argued Mar. 25, 2014); Tyndale House Publishers,
Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 1Il (D.D.C. 2012) (describing for-profit corporate
plaintiff as engaged in the publication of "Christian books ranging from Bible commentaries
to books about family issues to Christian fiction"), interlocutory appeal dismissed, No. 13-
5018, 2013 WL 2395168 (D.C. Cir. May 3, 2013).
Of course, the fact that a for-profit corporation manufactures or sells only religious materials
does not by itself dispose of the question whether it is a "religious" organization or a "person"
who "exercises religion" within the meaning of RFRA. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at
1165 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that for-profit Christian
bookstore is "focused on selling merchandise to consumers" like any secular for-profit
corporation).
4 See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (for-profit "construction
company"); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (2-1 decision) (for-profit supplier of fresh produce and transportation); Autocam Corp.
v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 2013) (for-profit manufacturer "for the automotive
and medical industries"); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013) (for-profit manufacturer of "wood
cabinets"); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1120 (for-profit "craft store chain"); Annex Medical,
Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1118, 2013 WL 1276025, at *1 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (for-profit
manufacturer of "medical devices").
49 See, e.g., Autocam, 730 F.3d at 623-24, 626-28 (holding individual owners of for-profit
corporation lack standing to challenge application of Mandate to corporation, and corporation
is not a person protected by RFRA); Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 381 (holding for-profit
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violate the Establishment Clause because they impose a material burden on
third parties.
II. PERMISSIVE ACCOMMODATION AND THIRD-PARTY BURDENS
In general, government accommodations of religion can be
"mandatory" or "permissive." The Free Exercise Clause mandates accom-
modation when religion is singled out for special burdens that are not im-
posed on secular conduct. 0 Although a mandatory accommodation is not
required in cases where burdens on religious exercise are imposed by relig-
iously neutral, generally applicable laws," Congress and the state legisla-
tures are free to alleviate such burdens if they wish via permissive
accommodations.52
Mandatory accommodation raises no Establishment Clause issue. Al-
though mandatory accommodations obviously assist religious exercise, they
do so at the command of the Constitution, in the same way that the Speech
Clause assists communication. This immunizes them from Establishment
Clause attack. It would make little sense to find that the affirmative com-
mand of the Free Exercise Clause facially violates the negative prohibition
of the Establishment Clause.
When an accommodation is not required by the Free Exercise Clause,
no interclause conflict exists, because the Free Exercise Clause is not at is-
sue. The resultant aid to religious exercise is accordingly subject to the limi-
tations of the Establishment Clause as the only religion clause in play.53 An
corporation cannot exercise religion within meaning of Free Exercise Clause and is not a per-
son protected by RFRA); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1121 (holding for-profit corporations can
be persons exercising religion who are thus protected by RFRA).
I See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (holding ordinances that had the effect of prohibiting ritual animal slaughter by minor-
ity sect but not secular and other religious animal killings subject to strict scrutiny).
s' See id. at 531; Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1989).
52 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("[S]o also a society that believes in the negative protection
accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation ....
But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted . . . is not to say
that it is constitutionally required."); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)
("The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not su-
persede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause."); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) ("The limits of permissible state accommodation to relig-
ion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause.").
" See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitu-
tional, Period, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 11 (1998) ("Congress does not have a free hand to
supplement [religious] liberty. The Establishment Clause provides a ceiling that does not
permit the government significant room within which to expand religious liberties."); Ira C.
Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 751, 753 (1992)
("Claims to permissive accommodations always raise Establishment Clause questions, because
their underlying theory is that government is free to respond beneficially to religion-specific
concerns."); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response
to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 687 (1992) ("Under the Establishment Clause, the
question is when (or whether) accommodations are constitutionally permitted.").
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accommodation of religious exercise that is not required by the Free Exer-
cise Clause is thus "permissive," and must satisfy the demands of the Estab-
lishment Clause.
A. Negative Religious Externalities
Three lines of decisions demonstrate the Court's general rejection of
accommodations that shift the costs of accommodating a religion from those
who practice it to those who don't. First and most important, a line of deci-
sions holds that the Establishment Clause prohibits cost-shifting accommo-
dations in the for-profit or secular workplace. Additionally, many of the
Court's exemption decisions under the Free Exercise Clause are animated by
this same aversion to accommodations that impose third-party burdens, as
are its decisions interpreting the religious accommodation provision of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finally, academic commentators at all
points of the accommodation spectrum agree that the Establishment Clause
precludes cost-shifting accommodations.
1. The Establishment Clause.
It is by now a commonplace view that Establishment Clause doctrine is
unstable, inconsistent, and incoherent. With respect to permissive accom-
modations, the Court itself has contributed to doctrinal uncertainty by often
articulating isolated Establishment Clause limitations without synthesizing
them into a complete and coherent approach.14
Nevertheless, the Court has been uncharacteristically consistent in con-
demning permissive accommodations that protect believers at the expense of
others in the for-profit workplace and other secular environments. The lead-
ing case is Estate of Thornton v. Caldor," where the Court invalidated a
state statute that granted employees an absolute right not to work on their
chosen Sabbath, irrespective of the costs their choices might impose on their
employer and coworkers56:
5 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet (Kiryas Joel), 512 U.S. 687, 702-07 (1994) (noting
that statutory permissive accommodation for orthodox Jewish sect constituted endorsement of
religion because it was not clear that legislature would grant comparable accommodations to
other religious groups); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985) (new state law encour-
aging moment of silence in public schools for individual student prayer lacked secular purpose
because, inter alia, preexisting law already permitted individual prayer and thus new law did
not relieve students of a state-imposed burden on praying). But see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709, 720-21 (2005) (upholding RLUIPA against facial Establishment Clause challenge
because it relieves a government burden on religious exercise, does not impose significant
burdens on third parties or discriminate denominationally, and facilitates private religious
exercise).
55 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
16 Id. at 708-10.
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This unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all
other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion
Clauses .. . : The First Amendment gives no one the right to insist
that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their
conduct to his own religious necessities."
The statute invalidated in Caldor generated what economists call a
"negative externality" - "a cost that one person, firm, or group imposes on
others without their consent.""8 By giving employees an unqualified right
not to work on their chosen Sabbath, the statute "externalized" the cost of
accommodating Sabbath observance from the Sabbath-observing employees
onto employers and other employees who did not observe a Sabbath. Caldor
thus involved a negative religious externality, because the externalized be-
havior - Sabbath observance - is religious.
A few years after Caldor, a plurality of the Court relied on the same
principle to invalidate a permissive state sales-tax exemption in Texas
Monthly v. Bullock.59 By restricting the exemption to religious newspapers
and magazines, the plurality reasoned, the state had increased the sales-tax
burden of secular newspapers and magazines subject to the tax in violation
of the Establishment Clause.w
Caldor's invalidation of permissive accommodations that generate neg-
ative religious externalities was unanimously affirmed in the Court's most
recent permissive accommodation decision, Cutter v. Wilkinson.6' The Court
rejected a facial attack on a provision of the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act 62 ("RLUIPA"), which prohibits government from in-
terfering with the religious exercise of prison inmates without compelling
justification. 63 In doing so, however, the Court held that to properly apply
RLUIPA, "courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on non-beneficiaries."" It further declared that
" Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
5 Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Re-
ligious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 46 (1989). "The damage to a farmer's crops caused by
engine sparks [from a passing train] is a cost of railroading that the railroad, unless forced by
law to do so or unless it is the owner of the farmland, will not take into account in making its
decisions; the cost is external to the decision making process." RICHARD A. POSNER, Eco-
NOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.10, at 71 (6th ed. 2003).
59 489 U.S. 1, 2 (1989).
1 Id. at 15, 18 n.8 (reasoning that "[w]hen government directs a subsidy exclusively to
religious organizations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and that . . . burdens
nonbeneficiaries," it has unconstitutionally endorsed the accommodated religion).
61 544 U.S. 709, 709 (2005) (unanimous opinion).
6242 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2006).
63 Id. § 2000cc-1(a), (b).
6 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 (citing with approval Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S.
703 (1985)). In Caldor, the Court struck down a Connecticut law that "arm[ed] Sabbath
observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on whatever day they desig-
nate[d] as their Sabbath." We held the law invalid under the Establishment Clause because it
"unyielding[ly] weigh[ted]" the interests of Sabbatarians "over all other interests." Id. at
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particular accommodations of prisoner free exercise under RLUIPA would
violate the Establishment Clause if they threatened the safety or other inter-
ests of third parties such as prison administrators or other inmates."5
2. The Free Exercise Clause.
Several of the Court's Free Exercise Clause decisions exhibit the same
aversion to cost-shifting accommodations as is manifest in its Establishment
Clause decisions. In United States v. Lee,66 for example, the Court rejected
the free exercise claim of an Amish employer who objected to payment of
Social Security taxes on his employees on religious grounds.67 The Court
made it clear that neither the Free Exercise Clause nor Congress could ex-
cuse employers who object on religious grounds to social welfare programs
from payment of employee Social Security taxes, because doing so would
impermissibly "impose the employer's religious faith on the employees" by
reducing or foreclosing employee Social Security benefits.68 Similarly, in
Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,69 the Court con-
strued the Fair Labor Standards Act to require that a nonprofit religious or-
ganization pay the minimum wage to employees working in its for-profit
commercial activities.70 The Court observed that exempting a religious or-
ganization's for-profit activities from federal minimum wage laws would
give it a competitive advantage over secular businesses competing in the
same markets, and "exert a general downward pressure on wages" paid to
employees in such businesses.7 '
3. Title VII.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an em-
ployer to discriminate against a current or prospective employee on the basis
of religion.72 Title VII defines prohibited religious discrimination to include
an employer's failure to make "reasonable accommodations" of an em-
722 (quoting with approval Caldor, 472 U.S. at 710) (alterations in original) (internal citation
omitted).
65 Id. at 722-23, 726.
-455 U.S. 252 (1981).
67 Id. at 252.
6 Id. at 261.
"471 U.S. 290 (1985).
70 Id. at 290.
7' Id. at 302 (dictum). Even decisions that mandate accommodation under the Free Exer-
cise Clause betray a concern with cost-shifting religious accommodations. See, e.g., Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 204, 208 (1972) (observing that exemption of Amish children from
school attendance statute would not cause "harm to the physical or mental health of the child
or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare .... ); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409
(1963) (observing that exemption of Sabbatarian from Saturday work requirement of unem-
ployment compensation regime would not "abridge any other person's religious liberties").
For an excellent analysis of the impact of third-party burdens on the compelling-interest test,
see Loewentheil, supra note 10.
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
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ployee's religious practices unless accommodation would pose "undue hard-
ship."" In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,7 4 however, the Court
authoritatively defined "undue hardship" as any burden on the employer
amounting to more than an insignificant or "de minimis cost."75
The Court's opinion in Hardison made crystal clear its concern with the
burdens that a stronger duty of religious accommodation would have im-
posed on employers and other employees. The employee in Hardison
claimed a right under Title VII not to work on his Saturday Sabbath. The
Court expressly found that the employer, Trans World Airlines ("TWA"),
could have accommodated the employee's demand "only at the expense of
others," by denying a more senior employee his or her preferred shift in
violation of collective bargaining rights.76 To do so, the Court reasoned,
would have violated Title VII's prohibition on religious discrimination in the
workplace by depriving another employee of seniority rights and shift pref-
erences based on whether or not the other employee observed a Saturday
Sabbath.77
The Court found the same prohibited religious discrimination in the em-
ployee's proposals that TWA either require supervisory employees with
other duties to cover his Saturday shifts or attract volunteers by offering
overtime or other premium pay:
[T]o require TWA to bear additional costs when no such costs are
incurred to give other employees the days off that they want would
involve unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their relig-
ion. By suggesting that TWA should incur certain costs in order to
give [the complaining employee] Saturdays off . . . [the em-
ployee] would in effect require TWA to finance an additional Sat-
urday off and then to choose the employee who would enjoy it on
11 Id. § 2000e(j).
74 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
7 Id. at 84.
76 Id. at 81.
7 Id. ("It would be anomalous to conclude that by 'reasonable accommodation' Congress
meant an employer must deny shift and job preferences to some employees, as well as deprive
them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others
Justice O'Connor expressed the same understanding of religious accommodation under Title
VII. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 711-12 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (finding "[s]ince Title VII calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation and
extends that requirement to all religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting only the
Sabbath observer," it does not endorse a particular religion or religion generally). Lower
courts have also expressed this understanding. See, e.g., Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., 797
F.2d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Title VII does not require absolute deference to the religious
practices of the employee, allows for consideration of the hardship to other employees and to
the company, and permits an evaluation of whether the employer has attempted to accommo-
date the employee."); see also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986)
(reaffirming the Hardison de minimis standard).
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the basis of his religious beliefs. [T]he privilege of having Satur-
days off would be allocated according to religious beliefs.'
The Court concluded that in the absence of powerful contrary evidence
of congressional intent, it would not construe Title VII "to require an em-
ployer to discriminate against some employees in order to enable others to
observe their Sabbath."79
In short, the Court has consistently resisted religious accommodations
that impose significant costs on third parties who derive no benefit from the
accommodation. As the California Supreme Court observed in upholding
the application of a state contraception mandate to objecting religious em-
ployers, the U.S. Supreme Court has never approved permissive accommo-
dations when "the requested exemption would detrimentally affect the rights
of third parties."80
Commentators have been as consistent as the Court in condemning per-
missive accommodations that materially burden third parties. Ardent ac-
commodationists,8' strict separationists,82 and many in between" agree that
7 432 U.S. at 84-85.
7 Id. at 85.
80 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 93 (Cal. 2004).
8 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 53, at 698, 703 (arguing permissive accommodations
that impose "undue" or "disproportionate" burdens on third parties violate the Establishment
Clause); see also Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
62 FORDHAM L. REv 883, 886 (1994) ("The compelling interest test allows government to
regulate for sufficiently strong reasons, principally to prevent tangible harm to third persons
who have not joined the faith."); cf. McConnell & Posner, supra note 58, at 46 (arguing that
accommodations are not mandated under Free Exercise Clause when they entail substantial
third-party burdens).
82 See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 99-100 (2013) ("Burden-shifting
exemptions [that undermine the general welfare] are prima facie objectionable."); Christopher
L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitu-
tional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 453 (1994) (stating the Establishment Clause does not allow
permissive accommodation to "proceed beyond neutrality to favoritism. When purported ac-
commodations have given preference to religious commitments at the expense of comparably
serious secular commitments, the Court has been understandably uneasy."); Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the Constitu-
tion, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 89, 115 (2007) (arguing that permissive accommodations that "im-
pose significant burdens on third parties" violate the Establishment Clause).
83 See, e.g., 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT
AND FAIRNESS 340-41 (2008) ("A valid exercise in accommodation . . . does not impose
unacceptably on others .... ). "[Any religious freedom right that's solely grounded in the
religious motivation for one's actions simply can't extend to actions that impair others' rights or
impose improper externalities on others.... Constitutional protection for inflicting harm on
others simply because of the nature of one's motivation . . . is virtually unprecedented." Eu-
gene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1511
(1999). See also JESSE CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 122 (1995) ("The Religion
Clauses should bar government from implementing one person's religious liberty at the ex-
pense of another's."); Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious Institu-
tions, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 202, 272 n.288 (2013) ("There are constitutional
questions . . . over the extent to which the Establishment Clause imposes constraints on discre-
tionary political accommodations that . . . go too far in privileging religious individuals and
2014] 361
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 49
the Establishment Clause precludes permissive accommodations that shift
the material costs of practicing a religion from the accommodated believers
to those who believe and practice differently.
In short, the Court and academic commentators are united in disapprov-
ing permissive accommodations that generate negative religious externalities
- that is, in condemning accommodations that shift significant financial
and other costs of a religious practice from those who engage in it to those
who do not.
B. Religious Externalities and Establishment Clause Origins
The consistent condemnation of permissive accommodations that bur-
den third parties reflects an original concern of the Establishment Clause.
There is broad consensus that, whatever else it was originally understood to
accomplish, the Establishment Clause was meant to prohibit the federal gov-
ernment from setting up any "establishment of religion" that resembled the
eighteenth-century Church of England.M The Court and commentators are
sharply divided on whether the Clause was intended to do anything more,
but everyone agrees that preventing this paradigm case of religious estab-
lishment is the irreducible minimum.
In both England and the American colonies, the Anglican establishment
received land grants, tax subsidies, and other government assistance to sup-
port devotional and other unambiguously religious activities." It was sub-
ject to government control of its leaders and liturgy," and - most important
for our purposes - it imposed legal and other burdens on dissenters and
nonmembers that it did not impose on members." The entire English popu-
lation, for example, was taxed to support the Anglican establishment, while
Anglicans themselves had no reciprocal obligation to financially support dis-
senting churches. Just as prohibiting negative religious externalities does
not account for all of Establishment Clause doctrine, neither does it exhaust
institutions at the expense of non-religious individuals or groups or the general public."); cf.
Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 85 MINN. L. REV.
589, 593 (2000) (showing that Court tends to find that purportedly religious activity is not
religious or not burdened when it imposes significant costs on third parties).
' See, e.g., Alant REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32 (1998); ANDREw KOPPELMAN,
DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALrTY 82 (2013); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED
FAILURE 23 (1995); JOHN WITrE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLs, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CON-
sTrruTIONAL EXPERIMENT 89 (3d ed. 2011); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 346, 388-89 (2002); Kent Greenawalt, Common
Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandings of the Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 479, 488, 491 (2006).
" CHESTER JAMEs ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 1-10,
20-24 (1964); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding,
Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 2105, 2131, 2146-59 (2003).
' See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 85, at 2131-44.
17 See, e.g., ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 85, at 1, 4-20, 24-29; McConnell, supra note 85,
at 2131, 2144-46.
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the original meaning of the clause. But concern with imposing the costs of
established religion on others was part of that meaning.8
Permissive accommodations that require unbelievers and nonadherents
to bear the costs of someone else's religious practices constitute a classic
Establishment Clause violation. Like the prototypical established church,
cost-shifting accommodations grant a privilege to those who engage in the
accommodated practice at the expense of unbelievers and other nonadher-
ents who do not. Indeed, forcing those who do not belong to a religion to
bear the material costs of practicing it is functionally equivalent to taxing
nonadherents to support the accommodated faith. 9 As Professor Ira Lupu
has observed, "If coercive taxation to support the religious practices of
others is a constitutional vice, so is coercive regulation of one's economic
affairs to the same end.""
C. Material Third-Party Burdens
Although there is broad consensus that the Establishment Clause pro-
hibits permissive accommodations that shift the costs of the accommodated
religious practices onto third parties, 91 there is uncertainty about how
weighty the shifted costs must be before they trigger anti-establishment con-
cerns. In Caldor, for example, the Court employed "significant" and "sub-
stantial" to characterize this trigger weight.92
The Court's actual holdings supply some content to "significant" and
"substantial." The Court generally has not found a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause when a preexisting burden on third parties was marginally
increased as the result of permissive accommodation. For example, exemp-
88 Cf. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of Bill Exempting Dissenters from Contributing to the Sup-
port of the Church (Nov. 30, 1776), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTFUTION 74, 74 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) ("[A]ll Dissenters of whatever Denomination from the
said Church [of England] shall . . . be totally free and exempt from all Levies Taxes and
Impositions whatever towards supporting and maintaining the said Church as it now is or may
hereafter be established and its Ministers."); James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785), in THE U.S. CONsTrnrmON: A READER 130,
130-31, at para. 4 (Hillsdale Coll. Pol. Dep't ed., 2012), available at http://perma.cc/HB2B-
8HDA (asserting that proposed Virginia religious tax "violate[d] equality by subjecting some
to peculiar burdens" and "granting to others peculiar exemptions").
8 CHOPER, supra note 83, at 124-25.
* Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 593 (1991).
91 See supra section II.A.
92 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985) (striking down permissive Sab-
bath accommodation because "there is no exception when honoring the dictates of Sabbath
observers would cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when the employer's
compliance would require the imposition of significant burdens on other employees required to
work in place of the Sabbath observers" (emphasis added)); accord Tex. Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("substantial"); McConnell, supra note
53, at 702 ("substantial"); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 82, at 116 ("significant").
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tion from the draft for religious pacifists3 increases the mathematical likeli-
hood that nonpacifists and secular pacifists will be drafted in their place, and
exemption from availability-for-work requirements for Sabbatarians 94 in-
creases the premiums of all who pay into unemployment insurance pro-
grams. The risk of being drafted already exists and is already substantial;
the same holds for mandatory unemployement insurance premiums. The ad-
ditional burden imposed by accommodating religious pacifists or Sabbatari-
ans, by contrast, is barely measurable; those accommodated are so few
compared to the entire population subjected to the law that it is not reasona-
ble to understand the exemption as a meaningful third-party burden.
The same analysis applies to narrow, targeted exemptions of religious
individuals from general taxes imposed on a broad swath of the population,
such as payroll or sales taxes.95 The exemptions are so small relative to the
remainder of the tax base that the increase imposed on those subject to the
tax is negligible. 96
Released-time programs, which allow participating students to leave
school for religious instruction while nonparticipating students engage in ap-
propriate school-related activities,97 provide still another example. While it
is true that formal lessons must halt until the participating students return,9
the suggestion that this constitutes the school as a "temporary jail"" or the
released time as a "dead hour" for nonparticipating students10 is hyperbole.
It is hard to see the burden in leaving nonparticipating students to the normal
activities they would undertake even if participating students were not re-
93 See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965).
94 See Frazee v. Dep't of Unemp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemp't Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1986); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9 We are not arguing here that all tax exemptions have a de minimis effect on others.
Exemption of religious nonprofit organizations from federal and state income taxes undoubt-
edly shifts a material portion of the overall tax burden to for-profit businesses. Income-tax
exemptions for religious nonprofits, however, are not generally understood as permissive re-
ligious accommodations; rather, religious organizations are excused from paying income taxes
along with numerous secular nonprofit activities that contribute to the overall welfare of the
community. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1971); McConnell & Posner, supra note
58, at 12-13 ("[T]he exemption of church property from real estate taxation is approximately
neutral because the same exemption is available to other nonprofit institutes that provide chari-
table services . . . .").
96 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982) (impliedly approving statu-
tory exemption from payment of Social Security taxes by self-employed individuals whose
religious beliefs prevent their acceptance of social insurance benefits); Loewentheil, supra
note 10, at 23 (concluding that the cost to nonobjectors of a religious tax exemption is "small"
when "spread across a large base of taxpayers").
" Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); see also McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch.
Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
9 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 309, 314.
9 See id. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that school serves as a "temporary jail"
for nonreligious students during released-time programs).
"0 Lupu, supra note 53, at 745.
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leased for religious instruction in the first place,' 0' especially when these
activities were typically substituted with voluntary reading or homework that
would otherwise have to be completed after school. 102
On the other hand, the Court has tended to find an Establishment
Clause violation when accommodation imposes a noticeable or perceptible
increase in the marginal weight of a preexisting burden on identifiable third
parties, or creates such a burden where none previously existed. In most
workplaces, for example, employees either take their turns working holi-
days, weekend days, and other undesirable shifts, or these shifts are filled by
those with the least seniority. Either way, the burden is fairly distributed
among employees regardless of their religious belief or unbelief, with no one
working all or most disfavored shifts indefinitely. In Caldor, however, the
Court seemingly recognized that employees belonging to the dominant relig-
ion - usually Christianity - would demand Sunday off, forcing non-Chris-
tian employees to work virtually every Sunday or employers to hire hard-to-
find Sunday-only employees at a premium.0 There can be little doubt that
employers and non-Christian employees would reasonably perceive these as
burdens imposed on them by the state's accommodation of Christian
employees.
Although a Free Exercise rather than Establishment Clause decision,
Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation"' illustrates a situation in which the Court
felt compelled to deny a claim for accommodation because it would have
created (rather than marginally increased) a third-party burden. The Court
construed the minimum wage requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act to
apply to the for-profit commercial activities of a religious organization be-
cause exemption would have created a competitive advantage: allowing re-
ligious organizations to pay less than minimum wage would have
disadvantaged secular businesses (and, potentially, their employees) operat-
ing in the same markets, where no such disadvantage would exist in the
absence of exemption. 05 Again, it is reasonable to think that those compet-
101 Cf McCollum, 333 U.S. at 209 ("Students who did not choose to take the religious
instruction were not released from public school duties; they were required to leave their class-
rooms and go to some other place in the school building for pursuit of their secular studies.");
id. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that a nonparticipating student "is required to
attend a regular school class, or a study period during which he is often left to his own de-
vices"). This proposition was also implicit in Cutter v. Wilkinson, where there was no sugges-
tion that release of prisoners to religious services under RLUIPA might burden
nonparticipating prisoners who continue with their normal activities. See 544 U.S. 709, 726
(2005).
102 This was Professor Gedicks' personal experience as a nonparticipating student in a
released-time program in place throughout his elementary school years. Professor Lupu exper-
ienced the same kind of program more negatively. See Lupu, supra note 53, at 743-44.
103 See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985).
1- 471 U.S. 290 (8th Cir. 1985).
010 See id. at 299 ("[T]he Foundation's businesses serve the general public in competition
with ordinary commercial enterprises, and the payment of substandard wages would undoubt-
edly give petitioners and similar organizations an advantage over their competitors." (internal
citations omitted)); see also Lipson, supra note 83, at 618 ("The Alamo Court appears to have
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ing in for-profit markets with religious entities relieved of compliance with
minimum wage laws would find such relief to be a competitive advantage
for the religious entities.
These decisions point to an organizing principle: the Court finds third-
party burdens problematic when shifted costs are likely to be taken into ac-
count in the private ordering of such parties. That is, the Court looks to
whether shifted costs are relevant to third-party decisions about how to act in
some relevant way. This principle determines whether the Court affords
weight to third-party burdens, and is nothing more than the concept of "ma-
teriality" that commonly controls liability in many statutory and common
law causes of action.'" A misrepresentation or omission in a securities dis-
closure document is actionable only if "material" - only if a reasonable
person would have considered the misrepresented or omitted fact within the
total "mix of information" relevant to a decision whether to invest in or how
to vote on a security.10 Similarly, a contract is voidable if assent was ob-
tained by a "material" misrepresentation'0 s - if the misrepresentation
"would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent."'"
And the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation makes one liable in case of
"justifiable reliance" on the misrepresentation - if "a reasonable person
would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question.""10
From a textual standpoint, "material" is a virtual synonym for "signifi-
cant" and "substantial,""' which the Court has already used to describe the
based its conclusion on concern for third parties. Without an obligation to pay a minimum
wage, the Court reasoned that the Foundation enjoyed a competitive advantage over 'ordinary
commercial enterprises' that were so obligated.").
in Cf BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1086 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "material" as "[o]f such
a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person's decision-making.").
"0' Applying an SEC rule that prohibits material misstatements or omissions in proxy so-
licitation materials, the Court found: "An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote. . . . What the standard .. . contemplate[s] is a showing of a substantial likelihood that,
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial like-
lihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable inves-
tor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 164 (1979) ("If a party's manifestation of
assent is induced by either a fraudulent or material misrepresentation by the other party upon
which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient.").
' Id. § 162.
"1o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 538 (1977).
'Compare OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (defining "material" evidence or facts as
"significant or influential, esp[ecially] in having affected a person's decision-making"), and
supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text, with OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (defining
"significant" as "[s]ufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention; noteworthy, con-
sequential, influential"), and OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (listing the fourth definition of
substantial as "[flirmly or solidly established; of solid worth or value, of real significance,
weighty; reliable; important, worthwhile"). See also OxFoRD ENGLISH DicrlONARY (defining
"substantial" as "constitut[ing], or involv[ing] an essential part, point, or feature; essential,
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weight of shifted costs that triggers an Establishment Clause violation.112 In
fact, the materiality (or lack thereof) of shifted costs accounts for nearly all
of the Court's holdings and pronouncements condemning cost-shifting per-
missive accommodation. The Court generally invalidates or disapproves
cost-shifting permissive accommodations when a reasonable person would
likely include the shifted cost as a consideration in deciding whether to alter
behavior burdened by the accommodation."'
In Caldor, for example, it is reasonable to assume that a non-Christian
would consider the likelihood of having to work most Sundays (rather than
merely occasional ones) in deciding whether to remain in or to accept em-
ployment at a business having Sunday hours. Likewise in Cutter, it also
seems reasonable that threats to the safety of prison employees from accom-
modation of prisoners' free exercise would cause them to consider whether
remaining on the job was worth it. In Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation,
finally, it seems reasonable to conclude that secular entrepreneurs would
take into account a religiously owned for-profit business's exemption from
minimum wage requirements in deciding whether to enter the market and
compete with the religiously owned business.
On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that permissive exemption
of religious pacifists from the draft would be a factor in the decision of
nonpacifists to comply with or evade the draft, since the exemption is merely
a slight, marginal increase in the large preexisting risk of being drafted;"l 4
material," and noting that in "later use" this definition is "difficult to distinguish from [defini-
tion] 4").
1l2 See sources cited supra note 92.
" We are not proposing a causation or other such test designed to determine whether a
person has actually altered his or her behavior in response to shifted accommodation costs.
We are arguing, rather, that as in securities, contract, and tort causes of action, a third-party
burden is material if it is sufficient to enter into a reasonable person's decisionmaking calculus,
regardless of the actual outcome of that calculus.
"4 We disagree with Professors Leiter and McConnell, each of whom has asserted that
draft exemptions impose serious costs on third parties, although for opposing reasons - Mc-
Connell argues that permissive accommodations involving substantial cost shifting do not nec-
essarily violate the Establishment Clause, and Leiter questions permissive accommodation
altogether. Both contend that the burden is significant, presumably because it constitutes an
increased risk of death. See LETTER, supra note 82, at 99; McConnell, supra note 53, at 704 &
n.77. But many ordinary activities involve risks of death that people undertake without a
thought, like driving a car (being hit by a drunk or otherwise reckless driver) and traveling by
air (plane crashes). The risk of harm is so remote that people simply do not consider it in
deciding whether to drive or to fly. Similarly, what matters in evaluating the Establishment
Clause constitutionality of a permissive accommodation is whether the costs it shifts to third
parties might be considered sufficient to enter into a person's decisionmaking calculus, not
whether the consequences of a realized risk would be severe. It seems unlikely that a decision
to flee to Canada or go underground to evade the draft during the Vietnam War would have
been affected by knowledge that religious pacifists were exempt.
For the same reason we disagree with Justice Brennan's argument in Texas Monthly that the
increased sales tax burden on secular transactions caused by exempting religious publications
from sales taxes constituted unconstitutional cost shifting under the Establishment Clause. See
Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (plurality opinion). Sales of religious
materials are a very small percentage of overall transactions in the economy of any state or
locality; the drop in sales-tax revenue caused by exempting them is miniscule, and any conse-
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that the miniscule increase in unemployment insurance premiums from cov-
erage of Sabbatarians would affect bottom-line decisions of profit-seeking
businesses purchasing such insurance; or that the parents of students re-
quired to remain at school during released-time religious instruction would
consider this in deciding, say, whether to send their children to another
school."'
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos'6 is the lone decision in which the Court has
upheld a permissive accommodation that shifted material costs to third par-
ties. In Amos, the Court held that a statutory exemption of religious organi-
zations from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'1' did not violate the
Establishment Clause as applied to the organization's nonprofit activities."'
The exemption enabled the Mormon Church to fire an employee whose ter-
mination would otherwise have been illegal. It thus created a substantial
burden on the employee where none previously existed."9
quent increase in the tax liabilities of others likewise insignificant. Cf GREENAWALT, supra
note 83, at 347 (suggesting that a permissive accommodation is not constitutionally problem-
atic if it merely entails a "marginal increase in [one's] tax liabilities"). The result in Texas
Monthly is better explained by the fact that a relatively small percentage sales tax on religious
publications is not a burden on religion, see Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization,
493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990) (holding on the eve of Smith that general sales tax on ministry's sales
of Bibles and religious literature did not burden its proselytizing), so that exemption from the
tax unconstitutionally endorsed or otherwise favored religion, see Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at
28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
"' As with all line-drawing rules, materiality creates a difficult issue at the margin - how
to distinguish between a slight (immaterial) shifted cost and a heavier (material) one. Com-
pare GREENAWALT, supra note 83, at 348 ("A slight cost borne by private individuals will not
violate the Establishment Clause; a heavy cost will amount to an advancement of religion at
the expense of other interests."), with Lupu, supra note 53, at 746 ("it is impossible to deter-
mine how much" of a third party burden "is too much"). One might deal with the line-
drawing problem with a rebuttable presumption that shifted costs are considered material un-
less shown to be trivial. Cf Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)
(holding, inter alia, that it constituted an "undue hardship" under Title VII to require employ-
ers to bear more than de minimis costs in accommodating employee religious preferences).
One would assume that burdens from shifted costs are a factor in the private ordering of those
to whom the costs are shifted, unless the shifted costs are shown to be trivial.
116 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2011) ("This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.").
"I Amos, 483 U.S. at 330. One might argue that other outliers are Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion, 397 U.S. 664 (1971), which justified a religious property tax exemption on the basis of
the unique social contributions of religious organizations, id. at 696-97, and Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), which upheld the
judge-made "ministerial exception" to Title VII under both religion clauses, id. at 707. Walz,
however, has long been understood as a case about neutrality towards religion, under which
permissive tax exemptions for religious property and activity conceptually fall under tax ex-
emptions for secular and religious nonprofit activities that contribute to the general welfare
and wellbeing of society, and thus are not religious accommodations at all. See supra note 95.
Hosanna-Tabor, on the other hand, is a mandatory accommodation. See 132 S. Ct. at 706.
119 The Court curiously offered that the burden was imposed by the church rather than the
law, Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15, but this made no sense: as Justice O'Connor pointed out, it
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The Court observed that a religious organization would be put at risk if
Title VII exempted only "religious activities" (as it did originally), thereby
forcing a church to predict which of its activities a secular court might con-
sider "religious" and thus exempt from Title VII.120 Accordingly, it held
that the exemption permissibly alleviated "significant governmental interfer-
ence with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their
religious missions."l2 ' This holding was expressly limited, however, to a
religious organization's nonprofit activities. Addressing the district court's
fear that wealthy churches might "extend their influence and propagate their
faith by entering the commercial, profit-making world," the Court empha-
sized that the Church's operation of the gymnasium was both a religious and
a nonprofit activity that had endured for more than seventy-five years.'22
The Title VII exemption upheld in Amos must be considered a permis-
sive accommodation case in the wake of Smith.12 3 In the post-Smith world,
Amos's holding can be justified by either of two alternate rationales. First,
Congress may choose to relieve a religious nonprofit organization of the risk
of liability when it insists that employees adhere to its religious mission.12 4
In this sense, Amos is now better understood as a modest extension to per-
missive accommodation doctrine of the mandatory church governance and
office decisions that (1) shield churches from government regulation or
oversight under the Free Exercise Clause so that they may effectively define
was precisely the statutory exemption that enabled the church to shift the burden of its relig-
ious beliefs and practices to an employee who did not subscribe to some of them. Id. at 347
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
120 See id. at 336 & n.14 (noting the Church's argument that "the District Court failed to
appreciate that the Gymnasium . . . is expressive of the Church's religious values").
121 Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
122 Id. at 337.
123 Things were not so clear in the pre-Smith world in which Amos was actually decided.
There it was presumed (at least formally) that the Free Exercise Clause granted relief from
even incidental burdens on religious exercise. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215 (1972) (holding that incidental burdens on religious exercise must satisfy strict scrutiny);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (same). Justices Brennan and Marshall, for
example, made clear in Amos their view that the statutory exemption at issue there was proba-
bly mandated by the Free Exercise Clause: "Determining that certain activities are in further-
ance of an organization's religious mission, and that only those committed to that mission
should conduct them, is ... a means by which a religious community defines itself. ... The
authority to engage in this process of self-definition inevitably involves what we normally
regard as infringement on free exercise rights, since a religious organization is able to condi-
tion employment in certain activities on subscription to particular religious tenets. We are
willing to countenance the imposition of such a condition because we deem it vital that, if
certain activities constitute part of a religious community's practice, then a religious organiza-
tion should be able to require that only members of its community perform those activities."
Amos, 483 U.S. at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). The Court also sug-
gested as much: "[I]t is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental
interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious
missions.. . . [Ilt is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of
substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious."
Id. at 335-36 (majority opinion). It did, however use permissive accommodation language
elsewhere. See id. at 334.
114 Amos, 483 U.S. at 336-37.
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and pursue their religious missions and goals, and that concomitantly (2)
deprive secular courts under the Establishment Clause of the power to en-
gage in theological decisionmaking.125 Indeed, there is considerable
resonance between Amos's holding that Congress may, if it chooses, protect
a church's ability to define itself and its religious mission and goals by al-
lowing it to discriminate in favor of religiously faithful employees, and the
Court's recent holding that the religion clauses protect a right of churches to
hire and fire those who perform ministerial functions, for the same
reasons. 126
Alternatively, Amos can be understood to allow Congress to remedy
religious institutional inequalities if it wishes. Under this theory of the case,
Amos merely gave to religious nonprofit organizations the same right held
by secular cause-based nonprofits to discriminate in favor of employees who
affirm and live according to the principles on which the organization is
founded.'27 As Justice Brennan reasoned, the third-party burden in Amos
was unavoidable if the church's right to define itself and its mission were to
be protected.'28 Amos is thus of a piece with other decisions in which the
125 E.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 698
(1976) (holding that church had final authority to decide whether and by what means to re-
move bishop); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952) (invalidating state law that would have superseded church authority to
determine what ecclesiastical body controlled use of cathedral); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702 (2012) (decided after Amos)
(reaffirming under both religion clauses that "ministerial exception" requires dismissal of law-
suits by ministers against their churches for adverse employment actions).
126 Compare Amos, 483 U.S. at 335 ("[I]t is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate
significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and
carry out their religious missions."), with Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (holding state
imposition of an "unwanted minister" on a church would violate a "religious group's right to
shape its own faith and mission through its appointments").
127 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 82, at 111 n.184. As Professors Lupu & Tuttle explain:
"[P]olitical parties are free to hire only those who are politically loyal to the party, feminist
organizations may insist that their employees be feminists, and so on. Similarly, the inclusion
of student religious clubs in the class of student organizations to which public schools must
give 'equal access' if the schools permit noncurricular clubs represents an accommodation for
religious clubs equal to that provided their secular counterparts." Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. of
the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding Equal Access Act
against Establishment Clause challenge)).
128 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-36. One might have argued that the Title VII exemption
was constitutionally required, but by the Speech Clause's freedom of association rather than
the Free Exercise Clause's protection of religion. Cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 644 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts of America is exempt from law prohibiting
discrimination on basis of sexual orientation by public accommodations, because discrimina-
tion was essential to its communication of its traditional moral values); Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984) (acknowledging that advocacy organization could discrimi-
nate on basis of gender if doing so was essential to communication of its message, but holding
that such discrimination was not essential to communication of Jaycees's message). The Court
rejected this theory, however, in Hosanna Tabor. 132 S. Ct. at 706. In holding that both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses constitutionally required a "ministerial exception" to
Title VII, the Court purported to distinguish Smith, but the neutrality and generality of Title
VII suggest that Hosanna-Tabor actually created an exception to Smith. It appears, therefore,
as if the doctrinal landscape surrounding Amos has been altered yet again. Whether Hosanna-
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Court has held that granting religious organizations the same rights and priv-
ileges afforded to secular organizations does not generally violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.12 9
In short, the Establishment Clause generally provides that material
costs of permissive accommodation of religion may not be shifted to third
parties. The only exception involves the nonprofit activities of churches and
other religious nonprofit organizations, where shifted costs are an unavoida-
ble incident to either (1) preservation of the religious organization's right to
define and control its religious mission, or (2) equalization of the rights of
such organizations with secular cause-based organizations.
D. Cost Shifting and Baselines
Any argument about impermissible cost shifting must identify the
proper status quo ante as the baseline measure of whether and to what extent
costs have been shifted.'3 0 For permissive accommodations, this baseline
can only be the distribution of relevant burdens and benefits for religious
exercise immediately preceding enactment of the accommodation.
Prior to enactment of the Sabbath-choice statute in Caldor, for exam-
ple, no employee had the unqualified right to refuse Sabbath work. Whether
any particular employee was required to work depended on formal and infor-
mal factors like the observant employee's workplace seniority or the availa-
bility of other employees willing voluntarily to cover the observant
employee's shifts. These and other factors insured that some of the costs of
accommodation were borne by Sabbath observers themselves, who had to
work Sabbaths until they acquired sufficient seniority to opt out or find will-
ing substitutes to cover their Sabbath shifts.
Once the statute gave Sabbath-observers an absolute right not to work
on their Sabbath, however, nonobservant employees bore all the costs of
Sabbath observance because they found themselves assigned to Sabbath
shifts regardless of their seniority or preferences. The statute, therefore,
shifted the costs of accommodating Sabbath observers from a situation in
which at least some of those costs were borne by the accommodated Sabbath
observers, to one in which all such costs were borne by nonobservant
employees.
Tabor created a class of mandatory accommodations that now encompasses the heretofore-
permissive Title VII exemption upheld in Amos is beyond the scope of this Article.
129 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (allowing religious student
groups same access to public university facilities as secular student groups did not violate
Establishment Clause); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1971) (including religious
nonprofit organizations in class of nonprofit groups entitled to property tax exemption did not
violate Establishment Clause).
130 Cf McConnell & Posner, supra note 58, at 6 (observing that the determination whether
government action has "aided" or "penalized" religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause, "one needs a baseline: 'aid' or 'penalty' as compared to what?").
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The draft-exemption cases provide a similar example. In the absence of
an exemption for religious pacifists, those in the draft-eligible pool (includ-
ing pacifists) face an equal chance of being drafted, and religious pacifists
who are actually drafted are subject to criminal penalties if they refuse to
report. Once a religious-pacifist exemption is introduced, however, religious
pacifists are immunized from criminal liability and removed from the draft-
eligible pool, thus increasing the probability that a person remaining in the
pool will be drafted. The cost of observing religious pacifist beliefs has thus
shifted from pacifists to nonpacifists (although, as we have argued, the
shifted cost is not material).
III. RFRA, THE MANDATE, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL COST SHIFTING
We demonstrated in Part II that the Court's Establishment Clause and
other decisions prohibit permissive accommodations that shift material costs
of the accommodated religious practice from those who participate in it to
those who don't. In the context of the Mandate, therefore, the primary issue
is whether employer exemptions under RFRA would burden third parties to
an extent that would violate the Establishment Clause.
A. RFRA Exemptions as Permissive Accommodations
A plaintiff who brings a successful RFRA claim is entitled to "obtain
appropriate relief' from the law or other government action that burdens her
religious rights.' "Appropriate relief' does not usually require complete
invalidation of the burdensome law; instead, the plaintiff is simply "ex-
empted" or excused from complying with the law. RFRA, therefore, is es-
sentially a means for plaintiffs to obtain individualized permissive
accommodations that relieve them from governmentally imposed
obligations.
When a legislature directly grants a specific "retail" permissive accom-
modation to a named class of religious adherents, it must comply with the
Establishment Clause limit on negative religious externalities.'3 2 It follows
that when Congress indirectly grants permissive accommodations "whole-
sale" through a general statute like RFRA it must also work within Estab-
lishment Clause limitations.' Although RFRA is probably not
unconstitutional on its face, it is unconstitutional when applied to grant a
religious exemption that the Establishment Clause would have prevented the
government from creating specifically.
'3' 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2011).
132 See supra Part H.
'I Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal
Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1977 (2001) ("RFRA is not
the Free Exercise Clause, and courts therefore must apply the Establishment Clause to draw
the constitutional boundaries of Federal RFRA.").
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The Court itself all but confirmed this in Cutter v. Wilkinson.M As
discussed, Cutter considered a facial Establishment Clause challenge to
RLUIPA, which Congress enacted to partially fill the void left when the
Court invalidated RFRA as applied to state government action.' 3  Like
RFRA, RLUIPA applies strict scrutiny to state regulations that substantially
burden religious adherents, though it is expressly limited to prison and land-
use contexts. Its text is virtually identical to RFRA's.136
In Cutter, the Court rejected the facial Establishment Clause challenge,
but acknowledged that RLUIPA is vulnerable to as-applied Establishment
Clause challenges.' It observed that if an inmate requests a RLUIPA ac-
commodation that would "impose unjustified burdens on other institutional-
ized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of an institution, the
facility would be free to resist" and "as-applied challenges would be in
order." 38
If RLUIPA is subject to as-applied Establishment Clause challenges
based on unacceptable cost shifting, as the Court held in Cutter, it is certain
that RFRA, its nearly identical twin, is subject to such challenges as well. 39
If an employer claims an accommodation under RFRA that imposes unjusti-
fied burdens on others, an as-applied challenge and invalidation under the
Establishment Clause would be in order.
In short, Congress enacted RFRA precisely to afford protection to relig-
ious exercise that the post-Smith Free Exercise Clause does not. Accord-
ingly, each application of RFRA to relieve incidental government burdens
on religious exercise is a permissive accommodation that must comply with
the Establishment Clause prohibition on shifting material costs of such ac-
commodations to third parties.
134 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
" Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 4, at 8 (discussing aftermath of invalidation of
RFRA as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
136 Compare RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)-(b) (2011) ("No government shall impose
a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institu-
tion . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest." (em-dash & paragraph numbers deleted)), with RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
1(a)-(b) (2011) ("Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability ... [unless] it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.").
13 544 U.S. at 726.
138 Id.
139 Cf Magarian, supra note 133, at 1995-96 (suggesting that RFRA "may be appropri-
ately applied" when it does not "impose substantial costs on nonbeneficiaries" of the
exemption).
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B. Preexemption (Not Pre-Mandate) Baseline
The RFRA exemptions sought by anti-Mandate employers would ex-
cuse them from complying with the requirement that their health plans cover
FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing. Absent RFRA exemp-
tions, in other words, the employees of such employers would receive the
benefit of contraception without cost sharing. The Mandate thus marks the
baseline for measuring whether such exemptions shift costs from the accom-
modated employers to employees who do not share their employer's relig-
ious anti-Mandate beliefs. The Mandate, in other words, is the status quo
ante that RFRA exemptions would disrupt.
Some Mandate opponents have argued that RFRA exemptions for anti-
Mandate employers would not shift costs to employees, because employees
of RFRA-exempted employers are no worse off than they would have been
in the absence of the Mandate - employees in both situations must use their
own funds to purchase contraceptives.'4 This makes no sense. It is like
defending a denial of Social Security benefits by observing that it merely
puts the disappointed claimant in the same position she would have been in
had the Social Security program never been enacted. 141 The problem, of
course, is that we do not live in a world in which Social Security does not
exist; Social Security has been enacted, and its enactment created a social
welfare entitlement, the denial of which to any particular claimant deprives
her of its benefits.
Other Mandate opponents simply rule the Mandate out of order. Not-
ing that the Mandate is new and controversial, they define the baseline for
measuring whether RFRA exemptions trigger impermissible cost shifting by
reference to a status quo ante in which the ACA and Mandate do not exist.142
This makes no sense either. There is no vesting period for federal statutory
entitlements.143 The Supreme Court has upheld the ACA as a valid exercise
of congressional power, and unless the Mandate itself were to be invali-
140 See, e.g., Brief of Nat'1 Ass'n of Evangelicals as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga, et al. at 7-8, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S.
Jan. 27, 2014); cf Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1144 (10th Cir. 2013)
("[W]e note a concern ... that Hobby Lobby and Mardel are, in effect, imposing their relig-
ious views on their employees or otherwise burdening their employees' religious beliefs. But
Hobby Lobby and Mardel do not prevent employees from using their own money to purchase
the four contraceptives at issue here.") No. 13-354 (U.S. argued Mar. 25, 2014).
141 Cf McConnell & Posner, supra note 58, at 5-7 (deriding as a reductio ad absurdum
the strict separationist argument that denying government benefits to otherwise qualified relig-
ious groups merely because they are religious is consistent with religious neutrality because it
puts the groups in the same position they would be in if there were no government).
142 See, e.g., Marc DeGirolami, On the Claim that Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause, CENTER FOR L. & RELIGION F. (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://clrforum.org/2013/12/05/on-the-claim-that-exemptions-from-the-contraception-man
date-violate-the-establishment-clause/, archived at http://perma.cc/7GJ4-9CPJ.
143 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
once the government "makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit becomes part of
the baseline against which burdens on religion are measured").
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dated,144 it defines contraception as "preventive care," which the ACA enti-
tles employees to receive without cost sharing.
Finally, still other Mandate opponents contend that RFRA is a preexist-
ing external limit on the Mandate (and every other federal statute and regula-
tion). Under this argument, no employee has a legal entitlement to the
benefits of the Mandate because the Mandate violates RFRA. Thus, depriv-
ing employees of benefits by granting their employers RFRA exemptions is
not a legally cognizable burden.145 But this begs the question whether the
Establishment Clause, like all provisions of the Bill of Rights, is itself such a
limit on RFRA - that is, whether the clause constrains applications of
RFRA that impose material costs on third parties, as we have argued. If the
Establishment Clause constitutes a preexisting external limit on RFRA, then
it of course trumps any application of RFRA that violates it.
In sum, the ACA and the Mandate created an entitlement to contracep-
tion without cost sharing for employees and beneficiaries of employer health
plans. RFRA exemptions would deprive the employees of exempted em-
ployers of this entitlement. Such exemptions would necessarily shift some
of the cost of accommodating employers' anticontraception beliefs from em-
ployers to employees and others who would derive no compensating benefit
from a RFRA exemption.
C. RFRA Exemptions and Negative Religious Externalities
The classic "third parties" implicated in the Mandate litigation are
those who either do not share the religious beliefs of their employers or who
share them as a matter of coincidence. They have a limited employer-em-
ployee relationship in which their employment is not conditioned on the em-
ployee's being a member of a certain religion or adhering to any religious
requirements. In these cases, the employees are truly bystanders in the con-
flict between their employer and the government. They will normally derive
no benefit from a permissive accommodation of the employer's religious be-
liefs or practices. On the contrary, many third parties are likely to prefer the
Mandate's provision of contraception without cost sharing, which they will
lose if their employer obtains a RFRA exemption from the Mandate.
The actual burden imposed on employees by RFRA exemptions from
the Mandate varies depending on the kind of employer and the breadth of the
accommodation it seeks. The situation in which cost shifting is most bur-
densome is the one being litigated most vigorously - for-profit businesses
seeking a complete exemption from the Mandate. In case of complete ex-
'"See supra note 4.
1 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. et al. at 54-55, Sebelius v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Feb 10, 2014); Brief of Constitutional Law Schol-
ars as Amici Curiae in Support of Hobby Lobby & Conestoga, et al. at 3-4, 18-19, Sebelius v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2014); Brief of Nat'l Ass'n of Evangeli-
cals, supra note 140, at 2-3, 5-8.
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emption, the costs of accommodating a for-profit employer's anticontracep-
tion beliefs are not confined to the objecting employer or its owners, but
externalized onto its employees as well.
In the case of a permissive RFRA exemption from the Mandate, em-
ployees who do not share their employer's anticontraception beliefs would
be denied their statutory and regulatory entitlement to contraception cover-
age without cost sharing, and thus would be directly saddled with material
costs they would not incur in the absence of the exemption. Employees and
their families would be deprived of the benefits of the Mandate to which
they are otherwise legally entitled. The RFRA exemption would require that
they pay the out-of-pocket expense of contraceptives and related services
that they ought to receive at no expense beyond their monthly healthcare
insurance premium. This is a direct burden that would not exist without the
permissive accommodation of RFRA exemption.
The externalized cost will be material for most employees. Effective
oral contraceptive drugs cost between $180 and $960 per year, depending on
the drug prescribed and the area of the country where the prescription is
filled.14 6 Many women experience unpleasant side effects from the cheapest
oral contraceptives (which are usually generic brands 47 ) or find that they are
less effective in preventing pregnancy.148 Some of the most cost-effective
and reliable contraceptives, such as IUDs and contraceptive drug implants,
have high up-front costs ranging from $500 to $800, in addition to one or
more examination fees, which can range from $75 to $250.149 Such costs are
a significant financial obstacle to the use of contraception by working-class
and lower-income employees.5 0 Individuals of all but the highest income
classes would find the hundreds of dollars of annual out-of-pocket expense
'" See Birth Control, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-
topics/birth-control-421 I.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/CZV6-
UMRB.
147 Consumers also may have legitimate reasons to prefer more expensive brand-name
prescriptions instead of generics that are unrelated to medical effectiveness. In recent products
liability cases, the Court has held that the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act bars products
liability suits against the manufacturers of generic drugs under either a failure to warn theory,
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011), or a design defect theory, Mutual Pharmaceu-
tical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). These cases have given generic drug makers
extensive immunity from tort claims when their products injure users. This immunity does not
apply to manufacturers of brand-name drugs. Consumers may prefer to use brand-name
pharmaceuticals to preserve strict liability actions against manufacturers in the event the drug
causes them injury.
48 Cf Adam Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services and
Supplies Without Cost-Sharing, 14 GurrMACHER PoL'Y REV. 7, 9 (2011) ("[O]ne-third of
women using reversible contraception would switch methods if they did not have to worry
about cost; these women were twice as likely as others to rely on lower-cost, less effective
methods.").
1 Birth Control, supra note 146; James Trussell et al., Cost Effectiveness of Contracep-
tives in the United States, 79 CONTRACEFrION 5, 5-6, 9-10, 13 (2009).
Iso See Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L.
REV. 363, 392-93 (1998).
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imposed on them by a RFRA exemption more than a trivial
inconvenience.'
One can easily imagine that low-income women might consider putting
off the refill of even a generic oral contraception prescription until payday
because, by the end of a pay period, they do not have $15 or $20 to spare. 152
For the same reason, such women may often find the $30 to $50 cost of
morning-after or week-after pills impossible to purchase when they are
needed or most effective. And of course, it requires little imagination to
conclude that the high monthly expense of branded oral contraceptives and
the high up-front costs of IUDs and implants will cause even middle- and
upper-income women to consider whether using these methods without
health insurance coverage is worth the opportunity cost of foregoing other
purchases.
To put the matter succinctly, the high absolute cost of branded contra-
ceptives, IUDs, and drug implants is material for women of most income
groups. And, women of most income groups who use the least expensive
forms of contraception would consider using more expensive forms if the
out-of-pocket cost were not a factor (as it would not be under the Man-
date).' This burden is also borne by male and female employees whose
131 Although we focus here on the materiality of out-of-pocket financial costs, others have
argued that RFRA exemptions would also impose less tangible costs. See, e.g., Loewentheil,
supra note 10, at 53-55 (arguing RFRA exemptions from the Mandate would symbolically
place the government on the side of believers as against the ability of women to participate in
the economic and social life of the nation by controlling reproduction).
152 See id. at 53.
'" Although not directly relevant to the materiality of shifted costs, the burden on em-
ployees can be measured by its breadth as well as its effect on each individual. For-profit
employers employ tens of millions of people; exemption of even a small percentage of such
employers from the Mandate would financially burden large numbers of people. The situation
is further complicated by the fact that it will rarely be clear to prospective employees that a
for-profit corporation providing secular goods or services is a "religious organization" or "ex-
ercising religion" as those terms are ordinarily understood. Before the controversy and litiga-
tion over the Mandate, for example, few people (including prospective and, one imagines,
even some existing employees) suspected that Hobby Lobby self-identifies as a religious or-
ganization. Cf Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1164 (10th Cir. 2013)
(en banc) (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the paucity of evi-
dence that Hobby Lobby was actually operated as a religious organization), No. 13-354 (U.S.
argued Mar. 25, 2014); accord Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 703 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner,
J., dissenting) (same regarding corporate plaintiffs in that case). The general public would
likely also be surprised to learn that many well-known national corporations engaged in unam-
biguously secular activities claim to self-identify as religious. See Mark Oppenheimer, At
Christian Companies, Religious Principles Complement Business Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/us/at-christian-companies-religious-principles-
complement-business-practices.html?smid=pl-share, archived at http://perma.cc/JBG2-MQW
2 (noting "In-N-Out Burger, Chick-fil-A, the trucking company Covenant Transport, and the
clothing store Forever 21 all call or market themselves as Christian or faith-based," and Tyson
Foods and Domino's Pizza were founded by religious conservatives). This is not to mention
countless small or local companies that do so as well.
Another real but not easily quantified cost would be the undermining of the health of wo-
men covered by RFRA-exempted plans, and a perpetuation of inequality in payment for
healthcare and in workplace competition. Professor Koppelman succinctly summarizes these
costs:
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spouses and dependents are beneficiaries of health plans sponsored by
RFRA-exempted employers.154
Direct, out-of-pocket financial costs to employees are the easiest to
quantify, but they are not the only material costs shifted from employers to
employees by RFRA exemptions. Individuals who wish to take advantage
of their legal entitlement to contraceptive coverage under the ACA would
have to decline employment opportunities with companies that are or might
be exempted from the Mandate. In times and localities in which jobs are
scarce, this will either significantly limit an individual's employment op-
tions, or cause her to sacrifice a legal entitlement as the cost of obtaining or
keeping a job.
The loss of contraception without cost sharing is a material shifted cost.
It is reasonable to think that a portion of the millions of employees and
family members affected by a RFRA exemption will consider forgoing the
contraceptive services they prefer in favor of less effective, cheaper meth-
ods. The requirement that they pay out-of-pocket for contraception signifi-
cantly alters the "mix of information" bearing on decisions about which
method of contraception to use.' 5 Women who must pay out-of-pocket for
contraception are less likely to effectively avoid unplanned pregnancies, and
they and their children are likely to face significant health risks as a result.'56
In crafting the Mandate, the Departments acknowledged the greater risk of
If the fundamental purpose of government is to empower people to lead good lives,
then a basic element of this is enabling them to control their fertility. Unwanted
pregnancy can deprive a person of control over the entire course of her life. It also is
relevant that one of the principal equities of the health care system before the Af-
fordable Care Act was that insurance often excluded coverage of medical needs spe-
cific to women, and so women bore higher health care costs than men - as much as
a billion dollars a year in the aggregate.
The contraception mandate improves the health of pregnant women and newborns,
reduces the disparity in health costs between men and women, and most importantly,
allows women to determine the course of their lives.
Koppelman, supra note 4, at 158, 162.
m Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act, young adults may remain on a parent's
health insurance policy until they turn twenty-six years old, even if they are married, not living
with their parents, financially independent, or eligible to enroll in their own employer's plan.
29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715-2714 (2013).
s See supra section II.C.
16 See Gedicks, supra note 9, at 149 & n.66; Brief of Guttmacher Institute as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Government, at 21-22, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354
(U.S. Jan. 28, 2014).
Health risks most directly burden the women and children who bear them, but they also
come at a cost to society more generally. Healthier populations are less of a strain on social
safety nets. Additionally, the effectiveness of the Mandate as a policy tool to increase the
health of the country would be significantly compromised if accommodations become com-
monplace. Standing alone, these generalized costs may be marginal, like increased tax bur-
dens or the likelihood of nonpacifists being drafted. Therefore, they are probably not material
enough to rise to the level of an Establishment Clause violation. But when viewed as part of
the cumulative costs of accommodation on third parties, these added costs demonstrate that the
overall burden would be high.
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preterm birth and low birth weight when pregnancies are unintended.' Wo-
men with unintended pregnancies are often unaware of their pregnancies for
longer than women with intended pregnancies. They may unwittingly delay
seeking prenatal care or discontinuing harmful behaviors such as alcohol use
or smoking until later in their pregnancies, when substantial harm to the
fetus already may have occurred."' Even when women are not surprised by
pregnancy, a longer period between two pregnancies - the "interpregnancy
interval" - decreases the later child's risks of low birth weight, preterm
birth, and small size for gestational age.'59
In short, if RFRA exemptions are granted to otherwise nonexempt re-
ligious nonprofit and secular for-profit businesses with owners who relig-
iously object to the Mandate, employees and their covered dependents will
lose hundreds of dollars annually as the result of a permissive accommoda-
tion from which they derive no benefit. They will suffer health risks as well
as healthcare and workplace inequalities. These costs are material because
they are significant enough that a reasonable person would consider them in
deciding whether to use less effective contraception or forgo it altogether.
Applying RFRA to exempt such employers from the Mandate thus violates
the Establishment Clause prohibition of permissive accommodations that
shift the material costs of accommodation from believers to nonadherents
and other third parties.&0
'1 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8727 (Feb. 15,
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
58 Id.
'1 Sonfield, supra note 148, at 8.
* RFRA exemptions from the Mandate may also violate the Establishment Clause in
another way, independent of their constitutionally impermissible cost shifting. As discussed,
see supra text accompanying notes 72-78, since 1977 the Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts
of Appeal have construed Title VII to permit accommodations of employee religions only
when the cost to employers is insignificant or de minimis, because accommodation at the
material expense of the employer or other employees would constitute the very religious dis-
crimination that Title VII prohibits. For nearly forty years, therefore, employees have been
entitled to accommodation of their religious beliefs and practices under Title VII only when
accommodation is essentially costless to the employer and other employees.
The exemption jurisprudence of Title VII, however, is in serious tension with employer
exemptions under RFRA. A RFRA exemption for an employer with religious objections to the
Mandate, for example, would accommodate its religion despite the material costs exemption
would impose on its employees. By contrast, accommodation of the religious beliefs and
practices of those very same employees is precluded by Title VII whenever it would impose
comparable material costs on the RFRA-exempted employer or other employees, since under
Title VII employee exemptions are permitted only when such costs are insignificant.
There is no imaginable justification for a permissive accommodation regime in which the
government affords employer religions more protection in the for-profit workplace than em-
ployee religions. This sort of accommodation regime may violate the Establishment Clause as
a governmental preference for the religious beliefs of employers over those of employees. Cf
Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet (Kiryas Joel), 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (sect-specific accommodation
violated Establishment Clause in absence of evidence that other religions would be similarly
accommodated); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (laws exhibiting denominational
preference subject to strict scrutiny under the Establishment Clause). See also Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, Symposium: Religious Questions and Saving Constructions, SCOTUSBLOG
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D. RFRA Exemptions and Litigation Opponents
Many churches and other such religious employers are already exempt
from the Mandate and so have no need to bring a RFRA claim.'61 Of em-
ployers that remain subject to the Mandate, those that would create the most
severe negative externalities on third parties are for-profit businesses that
seek total exemption from the Mandate under RFRA. This accommodation
would almost certainly impose unconstitutional burdens on third parties.
Because RFRA authorizes a court to grant any "appropriate relief,"
courts ruling on RFRA challenges to the Mandate might allow something
less than a complete exemption even if the challenge is successful. For ex-
ample, a for-profit employer might claim the same accommodation as that
afforded to religious nonprofit employers under the Mandate - to have em-
ployee contraception covered by third-party insurers or administrators - or
a court might impose that remedy as "appropriate relief."
Finally, self-certifying nonprofit employers may feel that the federal
regulations inadequately accommodate their beliefs. 162 If those employers
bring a successful RFRA claim to seek a complete exemption from the Man-
date, such an accommodation would impose at least some constitutionally
significant costs on others.'16
1. Churches and Integrated Auxiliaries.
Churches and their integrated auxiliaries are the employers best situated
to argue that they need not be subject to the Mandate because their employ-
ees are overwhelmingly likely to share their anticontraception views. These
employers, of course, are already entirely exempt from the Mandate.'"
Where the employer is an actual church, association of churches, or an
"integrated auxiliary" closely related to a church, it possesses a statutory
right under Title VII to discriminate in favor of employees who faithfully
follow the religious employer's teachings. Although employees of churches
are certainly bearing a significant burden as a result of this exemption, in the
loss of the statutory protections of Title VII, actual churches have a strong
constitutional interest in ordering their "internal affairs," including the defi-
(Feb. 18, 2014, 11:13 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-religious-ques
tions-and-saving-constructions/, archived at http://perma.cc/4B38-KS8R ("Weaving together
the threads of Hardison, Caldor, and Cutter, the Court [in Hobby Lobby] should recognize the
government's 'compelling interest' in limiting employers to exemptions that impose no more
than de minimis harm on employees . .. in symmetry with employees asserting rights under
Title VII . . . ").
161 See supra section I.A.
162 For-profit employers challenging the Mandate under RFRA have uniformly claimed a
right to complete exemption rather than to the religious nonprofit accommodation (which, of
course, has also been deemed inadequate even by many religious nonprofits).
161 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
'" See supra section I.A.
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nition and pursuit of the church's religious mission.'16 Churches thus have
powerful interests in ensuring that the individuals who participate in this
mission and represent it to the outside world are not only members of their
belief system, but exemplary ones.166
2. Nonprofit Religious Organizations.
Amos held that it was permissible for Congress to categorically exempt
all nonprofit activities of religious organizations from the religious discrimi-
nation requirements of Title VII.167 Unlike churches, however, many relig-
ious nonprofits choose to hire from the general pool of applicants, rather
than exclusively from a specific religious group. They are thus more likely
than churches to employ nonadherents or adherents who understand the re-
quirements of the affiliated religion differently.
In short, granting religious nonprofit organizations that are unsatisfied
with the regulatory compromise a complete RFRA exemption from the Man-
date would often impose impermissibly heavy burdens on their employees in
the same way as granting for-profit employers a complete exemption from
the Mandate.
3. For-Profit Businesses Owned by Religious Individuals.
In Amos, Justice Brennan wrote separately to "emphasize" that the
Court's holding only applied to the nonprofit activities of religious nonprofit
organizations,'68 while expressly leaving open the question whether for-
profit businesses might prove that they are religious in character. 169 Some of
this uncertainty stems from the difficult judicial analysis that is required to
determine whether for-profit activities can ever be sufficiently religious to
claim religious group self-definition and autonomy rights. In Amos, the
Court held that the activities of nonprofit organizations are categorically pre-
sumed to be religious in the context of Title VII.70 But as the Court held
and Justice Brennan emphasized in his concurrence, this categorical designa-
tion does not reach for-profit activities."' Justice Brennan suggested that
165 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).
166 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694 (2012); Amos, 483 U.S. at 341 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
167 483 U.S. at 330 (majority opinion).
168 Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
169 Id. at 345 n.6. "It is also conceivable that some for-profit activities could have a
religious character, so that religious discrimination with respect to these activities would be
justified in some cases. The cases before us, however, involve a nonprofit organization; I
believe that a categorical exemption authorizing discrimination is particularly appropriate for
such entities, because claims that they possess a religious dimension will be especially colora-
ble." Id. (emphasis added).
o
70 Id. at 340.
171 Id.
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for-profit businesses might present a colorable claim for an exemption with
respect to activities that "have a religious character,"' 72 but the courts would
still have to engage in a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the ac-
tivity was sufficiently religious."'
It is not enough for for-profit employers to claim, like churches, that
their employees are likely to share their religious beliefs. Unlike churches,
for-profit employers are not thought to have a strong church autonomy or
religious associational interest in being left free to define a religious mission
for their for-profit business, whereas these same interests allow and may
compel government to leave churches and religious nonprofits free to en-
gage in precisely this self-definition. Many individuals who subscribe to
religious faiths that condenm contraception will nevertheless use contracep-
tion themselves.17 4 Those employees would still be burdened with paying
out-of-pocket for contraceptives that would otherwise be supplied to them
without cost sharing.
Furthermore, for-profit employers subject to the Mandate are in most
cases subject to Title VII, 75 which prohibits discrimination based on relig-
ion. 76 Even if the employees happened to share the religious beliefs of the
employers, they are protected by the religious discrimination prohibition in
Title VII from employers who would inquire into their particular religious
beliefs and practices. For-profit employers are thus barred from controlling
the religious practices of their employees, because they cannot discriminate
in hiring and firing in favor of those with religious anticontraception
beliefs.177
Not only are employers prohibited from asking their employees about
their specific religious beliefs and practices, including whether they use con-
traceptives, but contraceptive use is "protected health information" that,
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,178
insurance companies and other healthcare providers are prohibited from dis-
closing to employers. 179
172 Id. at 345 n.6.
173 Id. at 340.
174 Cf Corbin, supra note 10, at 156 ("98% of American Catholic women have used
contraception.").
as Title VII applies to all "employers," which means "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e
(2011).
176 Id. § 2000e-2(a) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to ...
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.").
" Cf Amos, 483 U.S. at 329-30 (finding nonprofit organization owned by church permit-
ted to fire employee who did not adhere to basic tenets of faith).
'" Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
179 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013) (healthcare providers may not disclose protected health
information except in limited circumstances).
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In short, even if religious employers could make the showing that Jus-
tice Brennan suggests in Amos, and demonstrate that they have a colorable
religious dimension, for-profit employers are constrained by civil rights and
privacy laws from avoiding unconstitutional cost shifting by attempting to
assemble a workforce that uniformly reflects the employer's religious an-
ticontraception beliefs.
CONCLUSION: "RELIGIOUS LIBERTY" AND THIRD-PARTY BURDENS
Numerous studies have documented the remarkable religious pluralism
of the contemporary United States - including dramatically increasing
numbers of unbelievers as well as believers who do not identify with a relig-
ion or even as religious.s 0 Religious liberty remains a good of American
society, but it is only one of many such goods, and no longer the predomi-
nant one.'8 ' In such an environment, there is a limit to what the government
can do to accommodate religious beliefs and practices when the effect of
accommodation would reach far beyond the intended beneficiaries to burden
the religious and other liberties of those who reject the accommodated be-
liefs and practices.182
Despite the weakness of their constitutional free-exercise claims, 83
Mandate opponents have relentlessly deployed the rhetoric of "religious lib-
erty" against the Obama administration,'4 going so far as to accuse it of a
waging a "war on religion."' Whatever one might think of the original
no See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE 3 (2010);
PewResearch Religion & Pub. Life Project, Religious Landscape Survey, PEwRESEARCH, http:/
/religions.pewforum.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cclVGE2-PVKT.
18' Cf Koppelman, supra note 4, at 156 ("[R]eligion is one among many incommensura-
ble human goods that the state is bound to respect and promote.... That's a reason to promote
religious liberty, but it is not a reason to elevate religious liberty over other equally valid
human ends.").
182 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). "[E]very person cannot be
shielded from all burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious
beliefs. When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not
to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others." Id.; see also
Catholic Charities v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 468 (N.Y. 2006) ("[W]hen a religious organiza-
tion chooses to hire nonbelievers it must, at least to some degree, be prepared to accept neutral
regulations imposed to protect those employees' legitimate interests in doing what their own
beliefs permit.").
"I See supra note 4.
84 Letter from Rev. Paul S. Loverde, Bishop of Arlington, and Rev. Francis X.
DiLorenzo, Bishop of Richmond (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://www.vacatholic.org/docu
ments/HHSMandate-BishopsLetter-Jan20l2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4GTQ-T7HV
("[In issuing the Mandate,] the Administration has cast aside the First Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, denying to Catholics our Nation's first and most fundamental
freedom, that of religious liberty... . We cannot - we will not - comply with this unjust
law,").
'85 See, e.g., PHYLLIS ScHLAFLY & GEORGE NEUMAYR, No HIGHER POWER: OBAMAS WAR
ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2012); Bill Donohue, Obama's War on Religion, CATALYST (Oct.
2012), http://www.catholicleague.orglobamas-war-on-religion-2/, archived at http://perma.cc/
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regulatory proposals implementing the Mandate, the final rules refute this
accusation: the rules implement substantial protection for the liberty of those
religious groups that have traditionally enjoyed special treatment under
American law - churches and religious nonprofit organizations - and are
strong evidence of the extent to which the administration listened and re-
sponded to the religious liberty concerns of such groups while still adhering
to the statutory purposes and directives of the ACA,186 which is the constitu-
tional law of the land.187
For many Mandate opponents, this is not enough. They insist that
RFRA - if not the Free Exercise Clause itself - grants them a total ex-
emption from the Mandate, an exemption that will deprive millions of wo-
men of the considerable benefits of contraceptive coverage without
additional cost. They insist on the priority of their own religious liberty, in
other words, without apparent care for its cost to those who believe and live
differently.' 8
But this is also a violation of "religious liberty" - the liberty, long
protected by the Establishment Clause, to live one's life free of the religious
commitments of others. And unlike statutory claims asserted under RFRA,
this liberty is protected by the Constitution.
XD8A-NQX5; see also Rachel Weiner, Romney Ad: Obama Waging 'War on Religion,'WASH.
POST - THE Fix (Aug. 9, 2012, 8:04 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/
romney-obama-waging-war-on-religion/2012/08/09/192c4e02-e213-1 1el-a25e-
15067bb31849_blog.html, archived at http://perma.cc/E5UG-6PEX ("During the Republican
primary, when the Health and Human Services Department mandated that most insurance
cover contraception without a co-pay, charges of a war on religion were commonplace.").
M8 See, e.g., Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 4, at 24 ("[The] Final Rules offer a
serious plan to protect religious liberty without depriving women of contraception."); Lynch,
supra note 10, at 122 ("[T]he government's bend-over-backwards efforts to accommodate
religious employers with objections to the contraceptives coverage mandate demonstrates how
serious the Obama Administration is about preserving religious liberty without sacrificing pa-
tient access.").
"I Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
188 See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 10, at 2 ("[The bishops make no effort to under-
stand why their antagonists think that justice requires what the Catholic hierarchy thinks it
forbids."). As Cathleen Kaveny has pointed out, there is no little irony in the bishop's lack of
concern for those who would be harmed by exemptions from the mandate, since "[for years,
Catholic moralists and lawyers have railed against the assertion of rights claims without any
consideration of relational responsibilities." Symposium, supra note 10, at 10.
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